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DISASTERS AND DISCLOSURES
Donald C. Langevoort*
Corporate disasters happen with unnerving frequency. These can be
visibly dramatic events like fires, explosions, or toxic leakage that cause
physical and economic harm both inside and outside the firm. The BP
Deepwater Horizon oil rig catastrophe is a prime example, with loss of
life, environmental damage across a multi-state expanse, and great
consequential economic loss.1 Many are legal compliance disasters: a
massive fine or penalty imposed on the company after government
authorities determine that the corporation surreptitiously had violated the
law. Others may be on a smaller scale yet still painful, as with a defective
product on which the company had pinned its hopes, or the departure of a
key leader under questionable circumstances.
High-profile bad news events like these almost always produce highstakes litigation.2 Victims and their champions surface before, during,
and after the damaging event becomes public. And if the company was
publicly-traded, almost surely among these will be investors who own or
owned the firm’s securities. A defining characteristic of these kinds of
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to
Hillary Sale for helpful comments, and to Crystal Weeks, Dominique Rioux, Andrew Ko and Andrew
Hopkins for excellent research assistance.
1 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT—DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING,
Jan.
2011,
available
at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOOILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-ILCOMMISSION.pdf; Russell Mills & Christopher Koliba, The
Challenge of Accountability in Complex Regulatory Networks: The Case of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 9
Reg. & Gov. 77 (2015).
2 Indeed, there is an elite legal practice specialty in representing the “corporation in crisis” that includes
managing and helping resolve fast-spreading legal risk across multiple domains (federal and state, public
and private. This is part of a larger enterprise risk in the event of a crisis, with reputational
consequences that in turn affect the severity of the legal risk—the inevitable consequences of
“publicness.” See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 Brook. L.
Rev. 1629 (2014). On the connection between publicness and shareholder litigation, see Hillary A.
Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness and Securities Class Actions, 93 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 487 (2015); on the interaction of reputation, crisis and share prices, see Jiuchang Wei et al., Well
Known or Well Liked? The Effects of Corporate Reputation on Firm Value at the Onset of a Corporate Crisis, 38
Strategic Mgt. J. 2103 (2017).
*
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corporate disasters is that when news of the event becomes public, the
company’s stock price drops immediately and sharply, often “erasing”
billions of dollars in market capitalization. Investors naturally feel
damaged and want compensation. The most potent post-disaster remedy
involving publicly-traded issuers is usually a federal class action under
either Section 11 of the Securities Act of 19333 or the “fraud-on-themarket” theory for an implied private right of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The latter is
more common, and thus the main subject of attention here.
A fraud-on-the-market lawsuit allows for recovery of damages on
behalf of investors who bought or sold publicly-traded securities in an
efficient marketplace at a price distorted by fraud on the part of the issuer
or its management.4 To recover in the aftermath of a corporate disaster,5
purchaser-plaintiffs have to satisfy three main burdens of proof on the
merits (while facing a multitude of potential defenses). One is to
establish deception—one or more corporate statements that were
materially false or misleading when made, which plausibly distorted the
stock price to the investors’ detriment. In disaster cases, these are usually
claims that the company hid the risk of occurrence in the months, weeks
or days before the blow-up. The next is to establish scienter, i.e., that
these statements were intentionally false or made recklessly.6 Last is a set
of showings related to causation, which involves connecting investor
purchases class-wide to both the prior distortion and a subsequent loss in
value of the stock after some corrective disclosure was made revealing the
truth.7

Section 11 creates an express remedy for misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements
filed in the course of a registered public offering. E.g., Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council
Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318 (2015)(Section 11 suit involving a substantial compliance
disaster)(“Omnicare”). Public offerings are at best episodic in the corporate lifecycle and hence these
cases are relatively less common than 10b-5 cases even though the ’33 Act cause of action is more
plaintiff-friendly.
4 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014)(“Halliburton II”). The underlying
idea is that fraud in such markets harms all traders who assumed that the price was honestly and fairly
set.
5 I make no effort to define “disaster,” and indeed that word often is used loosely to describe any bad
news serious enough to lower a company’s stock price.
6 See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)(applying heightened pleading
standard for scienter).
7 See Halliburton II, supra (presumption of reliance for all traders who relied on market integrity); Dura
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)(loss causation). Separately, plaintiffs must justify
3
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Disaster-related fraud-on-the-market lawsuits can be controversial for
any number of reasons. There may be doubts about the propriety of
letting investors seek compensation alongside those more directly—
sometimes horrifically—injured by the disaster, because shareholders
may have been the intended beneficiaries of the risky business while the
other victims were simply put in harm’s way. As in most all securities
class actions, moreover, the main defendant is usually the corporation
itself rather than individual wrongdoers, so that amounts paid in
settlement or judgment (putting aside insurance) come out of the pockets
of all current shareholders,8 even though they too are victims of the
catastrophe. The class of plaintiffs seeking recovery under Rule 10b-5 is
limited to those who can demonstrate that they purchased their shares
after the deception began. Hence the feverish effort by the plaintiffs’
lawyers to identify false or misleading statements tied to the disaster as far
back in time as possible, to maximize the size of the class and resulting
recovery. Shareholders who bought afterwards have some chance of
recovery. Shareholders who bought before are just double losers,
suffering the share value loss from the disaster itself and from the
additional costs associated with the litigation in which subsequent
purchasers receive compensation.9
Legal scholars have generated an abundant literature examining each of
the individual elements of the cause of action (and sub-elements,
affirmative defenses, etc.) in an effort both to assess the soundness of
prevailing doctrine and contribute to the on-going debate over whether
such cases have positive net social value in terms of the compensation they
offer or the deterrence they provide.10 Less attention, however, has been
given to how all the different pieces mesh together.

the use of the class action device by demonstrating that common issues predominate, which is the
primary function of the reliance presumption.
8 See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 69 (2011).
9 See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421
(1994).
10 Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implications, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534 (2006) with James Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the
Market: But It’s Wrong, 7 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 67 (2017); see also James D. Cox & Randall Thomas,
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the
U.S. Securities Laws, 6 Eur. Comp. & Fin. L. Rev. 164 (2009); note --- infra.
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Disaster cases are mostly about distortions via the alleged concealment
of risk factors prior to the crisis. In an ideal world, serious risk factors
would naturally be subject to a duty to disclose, with scienter and
materiality the only hard questions—there is no social value to justify
deliberate concealment once those thresholds are met. Yet for a host of
doctrinal, pragmatic and political reasons, there is no such duty. The SEC
has imposed a set of requirements that sometimes forces risk disclosure, but
does so neither consistently nor adequately, and with uneven
enforcement. Courts in 10b-5 cases, in turn, have made duty mainly a
matter of active rather than passive concealment and thus, literally,
wordplay: there is no antifraud-based duty to disclose risks unless and
until the issuer has said enough to put the particular kind of risk “in
play.”11 But when that is, and why, flummoxes them.
A particularly striking example can be found in the litigation following
what is said to be Brazil’s worst environmental disaster, the collapse of
the Fundao dam in November 2015. The dam (holding back toxic sludge
from mining operations) was owned by a joint venture co-owned by two
global companies with mines nearby, Vale and BHP Billiton. Both
companies had securities traded in the U.S., and hence 10b-5 lawsuits
were filed separately against each in the Southern District of New York
for making statements touting their commitment to the safety of their
projects while not revealing facts allegedly known to both indicating that
Fundao was at risk. The public statements each made with respect to the
respective companies’ commitment to safety and the environment were
comparably soft and filled with marble-mouthed generalities. (Vale: “[w]e
are striving to build a company of solid values,” including “respect [for]
the environment and genuine care for the safety and well-being of fellow
colleagues and respect for the communities in which our company
operates,” and “we seek nothing less than zero harm”; BHP Billiton: “[t]he
health and safety of our people must come first and so across BHP Billiton
we’ve interacted with the whole workforce to reaffirm our commitment
to their safety and well-being, and to insist any work that is unsafe must
be stopped.”) Yet the reactions of the two district judges, ruling just a
few months apart, were palpably inconsistent on whether these
For a relatively early expression of this, see In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir.
1989)(duty to disclose unlawful marketing practice in light of affirmative statements touting marketing
prowess). For more, see J. ROBERT BROWN JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE sec.
10.03[D] (4th ed. 2017).
11
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statements could mislead the reasonable investor. No said the judge in
the Vale case, because the touting was ordinary puffery with no solid
communicative content;12 yes the judge said as to BHP because, while the
touting statements might indeed be general, they were nonetheless made
in a way that stressed the importance of mine safety “over and over and
over,” suggesting that the company knew that reasonable investors cared
about these risks and allowing the inference that it was trying to deceive
them.13 So who was right, and why? This incoherence could be
rationalized by a more thoughtful assessment of how words matter to
investors and better appreciation of the variable role that managerial
credibility plays in the process of disclosure and interpretation, which are
the two main contributions in what follows.14 But even if there is more
thoughtfulness to the endeavor, it is fair to ask why wordplay should
make so much of a difference as to duty in the first place, or whether
instead our impoverished conception of duty deserves a more thorough
makeover.
There are many pay-offs from this kind of inquiry, both academic and
practical. By looking closely at alleged falsity over the course of a disaster
timeline, we get a good glimpse of how disclosure works in real time, as
corporate executives and the company’s lawyers craft strategic responses
to the line-item disclosure obligations that the SEC imposes15 and
negotiate the murky world of voluntary disclosure—whether and what to
say in response to marketplace pressures (from the analysts, institutional
investors, the media and other vocal stakeholders) to reveal more than the
SEC forces about the risks the company faces. Research in financial
economics is paying more attention to these complex interactions—
essentially, the micro-structure of corporate communications—which are
far more complicated than suggested by the simplifying assumptions about
In re Vale S.A. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,658 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The court did,
however, allow the case to go forward with respect to separate allegations that Vale misled investors as
to the mitigation plans and procedures in place and in certain post-accident public statements.
13 In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 3822755 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) at *10. In footnote 3, the
court distinguished the alleged misrepresentations in Vale as “significantly more specific” than the ones
before it, but that is very hard to see much of a distinction from a side-by-side comparison of the
disclosures in question.
14
For an effort along these same lines so as to enhance the potency of disclosure and corporate
governance, see Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 91 (2017).
15 See Zahn Bozanic, Securities Law Expertise and Corporate Disclosure, Oct. 2016, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2662096 (evidence that elite securities lawyers
successfully help clients avoid disclosing what they don’t want to disclose).
12
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near-perfect market efficiency that once dominated. Courts are a step
behind, while lawyers seem to have found the doctrinal soft spots and
how to exploit them. Language matters, presenting opportunities for
obfuscation and gamesmanship.
In terms of fraud-on-the-market liability exposure, disasters are an
ideal (if disturbing) setting for thinking through the background norms of
corporate discourse—the implicit rules of interpretation for how
marketplace actors interpret what issuers say and don’t say, whether in
formal SEC disclosures, conference calls, press conferences and even
executive tweets.16 They also offer a distinctive point of reference for
thinking about contemporary controversies associated with bringing
matters of social responsibility (e.g., law abidingness) and sustainability
(environmental compliance, cybersecurity, product safety, etc.) into the
realm of securities law.17 Especially as more and more attention is paid to
the environmental, regulatory and social risks corporations face, with
fears of so many potential disasters in their future, this subject will surely
grow in both interest and importance.
To this end, Part I explores the duty to disclose disaster-related risks,
separating between two main sources of disclosure obligations in the runup to catastrophe: those created by the SEC, and those imposed by the
courts mainly via the half-truth doctrine, from which comes so much of
the gamesmanship. Part II then examines the especially problematic duty
questions that arise when what is concealed was at the time under
investigation from regulators or prosecutors, or was concealed unlawful
behavior. Part III turns to duty once the crisis has become public, when
the issuer has to narrate the disaster as it unfolds. Then we turn to ways
in which duty affects other elements of the fraud cause of action as applied
to corporate disasters. Part IV considers the connections between duty
and scienter; Part V does the same with respect to causation and damages.
Part VI applies the foregoing to the burgeoning subject of sustainability
disclosure, and Part VII concludes.

See Gregory S. Miller & Douglas J. Skinner, The Evolving Disclosure Landscape: How Changes in
Technology, the Media and Capital Markets Are Affecting Disclosure, 53 J. Acct. Res. 221 (2015).
17 See generally Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999).
16
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I. DISASTERS AND DECEPTION

A. The Centrality of Duty

The law at work in determining whether there was deception in the
course of some corporate disaster and if so when it began derives from a
fundamental question: does (or should) the issuer have a duty to reveal
material inside information that indicates that the disaster is looming, if
not already in progress? In principle, at least, it is hard to see in theory
why not, assuming that we wish for stock prices to be as accurate as
possible.18 This category of information is not the sort that we privilege
from disclosure in the interest of encouraging production and
innovation—the main reason for truncating disclosure duties.19 To be
sure, the issuer that makes such disclosure will suffer (and hence its
shareholders will, too), but the benefit of candor to the market at large
coupled with the socially beneficial externalities in the allocation of
capital, better corporate governance and otherwise, trumps that
particular self-interest in hiding bad news.
That is not to deny that there are real costs to take account of when
mandating this kind of risk disclosure. These include the cost of
collecting information and weeding out the immaterial risks from the
material ones, and the concern that speculative disclosure may be
misinterpreted and lead to over-reaction by investors and other
stakeholders. More subtly, there is often fear of the self-fulfilling
prophecy: that disclosure of a possibility (e.g., a threatened government
lawsuit) by itself makes the disaster more likely or weakens the
company’s ability to prevent it. All this is part of the balancing the SEC is
supposed to do. This article is not the place to attempt a cost-benefit
analysis or formulate ideal disclosure policy for disaster-related risks
generally, though we will certainly look more closely at the challenges
that arise over the course of the disaster timeline. My sense, for what it is
worth, is that the SEC has fallen short of the optimal in its policies
E.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wisc.
L. Rev. 297; Thompson & Sale, supra, at 530-31.
19 See Edmund Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 763 (1995).
18
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relating to risk disclosure,20 and that this failing has had an unfortunately
spillover effect on fraud litigation.
The courts play a backup role here, with a more limited mandate of
imposing disclosure duties only to the extent that nondisclosure
constitutes fraud. As courts have formulated Rule 10b-5’s “duty to
disclose,” the concealed truth must be of course be material, i.e., of
importance to a reasonable investor.21 But that is only the starting point,
much as many plaintiffs and their lawyers wish otherwise. There is no
liability simply because investors would consider the secret important and
like to know it.22 There must also be a duty to speak. While there are a
number of duty theories, by far the most important is the half-truth
doctrine—once the issuer speaks, it must tell both the literal truth and
the whole truth, not omitting any hidden facts necessary to make what is
said not misleading.23 This potent textual coupling is found in the text of
the most important express antifraud provisions under the securities laws,
as well as in Rule 10b-5. In its recent Omnicare decision,24 the Supreme
Court had something to say about finding half-truths in statements of
opinion (there in the context of a compliance failure), which is relevant to
all disaster cases.25
See Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75
Wash. U.L.Q. 753 (1997).
21 These same challenges arise in the assessment of materiality. See Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v.
Siricusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011). Though usually treated as a stand-alone requirement, the materiality
determination is really just a part of assessing whether a misstatement or omission was deceptive.
22 In other words, materiality does not itself create a duty. This step was not obvious as a matter of law
until the early 1980s, when it emerged out of dicta in two Supreme Court rulings: Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), an insider trading case, and Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 n. 17
(1988), a materiality decision. As a result of the indirect way the law of duty formed, there is no
overarching theory, which has led to a very “muddled” body of precedent. See Donald C. Langevoort
& G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1639 (2004). On
the duty to disclose prior to those two Supreme Court decisions, see Jeffrey Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the
Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935 (1979).
23 As courts often point out, this is not actually a disclosure obligation since the fraud is in what was
said, not what was not said. Nonetheless it operates as such if the only way to speak truthfully would
be to reveal the hidden fact. See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by
Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (1999). The other forms of duty include fiduciary obligation,
and the duties to update and correct. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 722-26 (8th ed. 2017); note -- infra. Though these could be raised in disaster cases, they
tend not to be.
24 Omnicare was a Section 11 case brought pursuant to the Securities Act (see note --- supra) but most
courts since have applied its reasoning to fraud-on-the-market litigation under Rule 10b-5 as well.
25 Hillary Sale and I have recently explored both the discourse and corporate governance implications
of Omnicare, the substance of which need not be repeated Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We
20
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The half-truth doctrine forces judges to assess claim of hidden risks by
reference to whether what was undisclosed rendered what was said
incomplete, thereby crossing the dividing line from passive to active
concealment. In the Deepwater Horizon securities lawsuit, for example,
the main pre-explosion storyline put forth by plaintiffs was that BP was
stressing enhanced safety measures that were put in place after a previous
oil spill disaster, while failing to reveal the extent to which rigs not
directly owned by BP, like Deepwater, were not subjected to the same
procedures.26 In the Fundao dam cases, the touting allegedly covered up
private warnings over a series of years from contractors, inspectors and
licensing authorities questioning the stability of the dam.27 Any careful
reader of judicial decisions in this area involving defendants’ pre-trial
motions to dismiss will note how much time is spent going one by one
through plaintiffs’ often lengthy list of claimed misrepresentations and
omissions to determine whether a reasonable investor would really have
been misled by them, assuming plaintiff’s claims about hidden risks are
otherwise true.
This task is taken on by judges with surprising confidence, even though
that question is really quite difficult given how many different kinds of
investors interact in our financial markets and the varying mixes of
information to which they have access.28 These seem like mixed
questions of law and fact of the sort commonly left to fact-finders at trial,
which is exactly what the plaintiffs’ attorneys want to have happen.29 And
indeed that is what judges do say when rejecting motions to dismiss. Yet
Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 Duke L.J. 763 (2016); see also
James D. Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements after Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits for Failure to Comply with the
Law, 68 SMU L. Rev. 715 (2015).
26 See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2d 600 (S.D. Tex. 2013). There were also postexplosion disclosure issues, discussed infra. A prior BP disaster also triggered high-profile shareholder
litigation and was the background for the subsequent Deepwater claims. See Reese v. Malone, 747
F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014).
27 See pp. ---- supra.
28 For just a sampling of this literature, see David Hoffman, The “Duty” to be a Rational Shareholder, 90
Minn. L. Rev. 537 (2006); Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. Rev. 461 (2015); Charles
Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1581 (2017). Some courts describe this
as a materiality inquiry, but that isn’t right. The question is not whether a reasonable investor would
consider the statement important on its face but rather whether the reasonable investor would be
misled by the omission of what is a material fact. See note --- supra.
29 It is well understood in both the case law and academic commentary that fraud-on-the-market trials
almost never occur, because the high-stakes case will be settled beforehand. Hence the stepped up pretrial judicial role on these fact-like questions mainly helps determine whether there will be a settlement
(yes, in all likelihood, unless the case is dismissed) and how much money defendants will agree to pay.
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at least as often, it seems, judges take them on as their own to decide.
This stepped-up judicial role on questions of how reasonable investors
think has been noted by a number of legal scholars, some of whom
express doubt about whether such judges are usurping the fact-finding
prerogative of juries.30
Here, I want put both motivation and procedural legitimacy to the side
and dig more deeply into the norms of “implicature” associated with a
looming or imminent disaster—what investors are likely (or should be
entitled) to draw from corporate statements about the risk and reality
beyond the strict confines of the words employed. Implicature is used by
philosophers who study truth-telling and lies to explain, for instance, why
it is deceitful to respond accurately to a request for directions to a gas
station from a hapless out-of-town visitor without mentioning that the gas
station is closed.31 It is, because the speaker was signaling a willingness to
be helpful and cooperative, and instead being just the opposite. Our
question, essentially, is whether corporate executives should be held to a
similarly cooperative signal when communicating with investors, or to
something different.
Certain patterns of argument are typical in these cases. Defendants
commonly claim that whatever was said, no matter how upbeat, was too
general, speculative or vague to be anything more than “puffery,” so that
it was neither material nor misleading no matter what was not being
said.32 The reasonable investor, they say, knows enough not to rely on
How courts make such decisions as a matter of law is unclear. One influential article claims that
judges are largely disinterested in these kinds of cases, and employ simple (and often empirically
doubtful) heuristics. Stephen Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Law Opinions, 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002); see
also Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 903 (2002). Or perhaps politics are at
work, so that business friendliness is the real driver behind the rate of aggressive dismissals. Id. I have
argued that judges are inclined substitute themselves for the reasonable investor and ask whether they
would have felt misled, which introduces a bias when the judge has an inflated sense of self-efficacy or
unrealistically demanding sense of how investors should react to disclosures. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Review Essay: Are Judges Motivated to Create “Good” Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51 Emory L.J. 309 (2002).
31 See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, ch. 2 (1989). For a sampling of the literature
putting implicature to use in business settings, see Robert Bloomfield, A Pragmatic Approach to More
Efficient Corporate Disclosure, 26 Acct. Horizons 357 (2012); Langevoort & Gulati, supra; Peter Tiersma,
The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1995).
32 See City of Pontiac Ret. System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2014)(“It is well established
that general statements about reputation, integrity and compliance with ethical norms are inactionable
‘puffery,’ meaning that they are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them”). For a
good recent discussion of cases going both ways, see Lipton, supra, at 112-16.
30
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statements devoid of hard facts or concrete representations, and can read
between the lines well enough to know what is not being said and hence
tread carefully, not assume that they’ve been told all that is important.
Soft language, in other words, doesn’t matter at all. This is often
bolstered by the argument that the securities laws are not meant to force
corporations to accuse themselves of wrongdoing or mismanagement.
This becomes the contested territory that judges have to work their way
through.
There are countless examples of this battling: the Deepwater Horizon
and Fundao dam cases have already been noted, and there are so many
others plucked out of recent headline news (Volkswagen,33 Wells Fargo,34
etc.). For our purposes, an especially intriguing example involves a lesser
kind of disaster: the Hewlett-Packard corporate governance scandal,
wherein its highly-regarded CEO was forced out after allegations of
sexual harassment and a cover-up. Were statements he and others made
touting HP’s improved code of conduct—a response to an earlier
corporate governance disaster at the company—misleading for failure to
disclose his apparent disregard of it? The Ninth Circuit said no,35 but why
not? The opinion offers a jumble of reasons, none particular incisive.
The remainder of this part seeks a better way of answering the question.

B. “Voluntary” Disclosures

We start the search by looking at the legal context surrounding the
disclosure and asking whether it voluntary or required pursuant to SEC
rule. Presumably, investor assumptions and expectations change when
they receive a message voluntarily offered as compared to one made
under the compulsion of a disclosure regime meant for their benefit.
Because the SEC is the disclosure standard-setter, it might seem logical to
start with the latter. But for reasons that will become clear, most disaster
disclosure issues arise out of voluntary disclosures, where the judicial
In re Volkswagen (Clean Diesel) Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal., July
19, 2017).
34 In re Wells Fargo & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,900 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 4, 2017).
35 See Retail, Hotel & Dep’t Store Local 338 Pension Fund v. Hewlett Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9 th
Cir. 2017).
33
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responses focus entirely on whether what was said was misleading or not.
So we begin there.
It has long been acknowledged that investors have a strong thirst for
information well beyond what mandatory disclosure offers, especially
with respect to forward-looking information. Securities analysts take the
lead here to lobby on behalf of institutional clients and (on the sell-side)
the public investors who read their reports, seeking access to
management insights via both conference calls and private audiences with
management within limits set by the SEC.36 Pressure to disclose comes
from other sources as well—the financial media, stock exchanges,
regulators, social and investor activists, and the like. In the aggregate,
these are the uncomfortable demands of publicness.37
Managers have discretion in whether and how to respond. They may
be hesitant, under advice from their own lawyers, to makes disclosures
that might create inflated expectations and generate future litigation.
And certainly they would prefer not, all other things being equal, to
reveal their failures and troublesome risks. But they cannot ignore the
financial market pressures, either. A large literature in financial
economics has studied voluntary disclosure choices and found
considerable variance in practice depending as to whom management
mainly caters.38 Where a company’s investor base is transient (i.e., made
up of active traders), failure to develop a reputation for real-time candor
will result in a depressed stock price, which management may well prefer
to avoid. Voluntary disclosure will fairly robust as a result, as long as the
rewards to candor outweigh the costs. In contrast, short-run voluntary
See Lawrence D. Brown et al., Inside the Black Box of “Sell Side” Financial Analysts, 53 J. Acct. Res. 1
(2015); Lawrence D. Brown et al., The Activities of Buy-Side Analysts and the Determinants of their Stock
Recommendations, 62 J. Acct. & Econ. 139 (2016). The SEC’s Regulation FD bars selective disclosure to
analysts, in order to force issuers into public disclosure of any material nonpublic information they
want to disclose at all.
37 See note --- supra.
38 E.g., Douglas Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News?, 32 J. Acct. Res. 38 (1994). In law,
an important debate emerged in the 1980s about whether mandatory disclosure was necessary in light
of the pressures and incentives for voluntary disclosure, and if so, how and why—one that continues
today. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 669 (1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 722 (1984); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998); Merritt Fox, Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1999). For a more recent assessment by financial
economists, see Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilota, Disclosure and Financial Regulation, in NIAMH MOLONEY
ET AL., EDS., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2015).
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disclosure incentives diminish in potency when the investor base is less
focused on liquidity or management is more indifferent to stock price
pressures.
These are purely financial incentives. But as society has become more
sensitive to private sector risk-taking in the face of environmental and
other “sustainability” threats, worries about looming disasters become of
general political interest, too. Climate change palpably triggers such
short and long-term concerns, as do matters of safety, cybersecurity,
human rights, etc. Hence there is considerable pressure on companies to
address these issues on a regular basis for a broader audience, increasingly
in elaborate written reports. The content of these sustainability reports
will often be directly at issue in disaster-related securities fraud claims.
The growing interest in “ESG” (environmental, social and governance)
disclosure is at least partly non-financial—prodding companies toward
greater social responsibility for its own sake—but the distinction is
fuzzy.39 Companies indifferent to sustainability may lag financially, and
more and more long-term investors report being interested in how
management addresses these diffuse sorts of risks and handles stresses
when they occur.40 In other words, there is a large group of people
interested in sustainability disclosure for diverse reasons that are
impossible to separate.
This multi-sourced public angst—which management probably sees as
both unreasonable and excessive—naturally tempts those who speak on
the issuer’s behalf to try to manage impressions so as to reduce the
pressures. Voluntary disclosures tend to accentuate the positive, though
the optimism may be tempered by lawyer-driven warnings about
forward-looking uncertainty. And that takes us back to fraud-on-themarket litigation. After a disaster happens, plaintiffs’ counsel will comb
through everything said earlier in an upbeat fashion to identify what
possibly may have had the propensity to mislead investors, all of which
See Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J.
Corp. L. 647 (2016).
40 See Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart
Money, J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis (forthcoming, 2017). There is evidence of a separating equilibrium as
between long-term patient investors and short-term traders, with the demand for sustainability
disclosures being from the former and not the latter. See Laura Starks et al., Corporate ESG Profiles and
Investor
Horizons,
Oct.
2017,
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049943. In turn, the level of voluntary ESG
disclosure is higher in firms that attract more of the former to their shareholder base.
39
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(with the accompanying scienter allegations) becomes the core of their
fraud-on-the-market lawsuit. Plaintiffs search for blatant lies if possible,
but more likely half-truths. Complaints usually offer scores of individual
statements said to have deceived, which courts will have to evaluate oneby-one in response to defendants’ inevitable motion to dismiss. How
they do this is worth more careful attention.

1. Language Matters, Even in Efficient Markets

Probably the most common explanation courts give for a skeptical
approach to whether a reasonable investor would be misled by any kind of
soft pre-disaster language is that investors are savvy lot, steely-eyed and
not easily tricked. Of course judges do understand that many retail
investors are not particularly sophisticated, but at least in fraud-on-themarket cases, they generally work on the assumption that the smart
money drives securities prices, thus justifying heightened rigor. This is the
assumption, for example, behind the puffery doctrine noted earlier,
whereby courts routinely dismiss fraud claims based on general
statements of optimism, no matter how ugly the concealed truth really
might be.41 Puffery is the label courts most often use in disaster cases
when dismissing cases on duty grounds, essentially saying that since
investors are unlikely to any attention to what was said in the first place,
they could not have been misled by what was omitted. The same thing
happens in treatments of forward-looking statements like the “bespeaks
caution” doctrine (dismissing claims where investors are warned about
future uncertainties)42 or the notion that projections or estimates are not
actionable unless characterized as reasonably certain to occur.
While many of these holdings simply accord with common sense,
aggressively invoking the imaginary mindset of the sophisticated investor
to decide these cases has two problems. One is that it proves way too
much. A thoroughly savvy, skeptical investor would never draw any
E.g., David Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1395 (2006); Stefan Padfield, Is
Puffery Material to Investors?, Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 339, 354 (2008);
Cox, supra.
42 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 Bus. Law. 481 (2004).
41
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inference beyond what explicitly was said, if that, and would assume
instead that any hedged or limited statement was an effort to avoid
revealing anything more. But that renders the half-truth doctrine useless,
contrary to the prominence it has in the text of Rule 10b-5 and the ample
judicial embrace the doctrine has received. A meaningful half-truth
principle has to have some room for credulity.43 But once we concede
that, it is hard to know when to stop.
The other problem is an empirical one. In looking at actual investor
behavior (or price formation) in well-organized markets, what do we
observe with respect to the influence of wordplay? For a long time,
assumptions about market efficiency supported a reflexive stance in fraudon-the-market cases. If market prices adjust immediately and in unbiased
fashion to all news that becomes publicly available, we can surmise that in
equilibrium the prevailing market price accurately reflect the fundamental
value of the issuer’s shares. The mechanisms of market efficiency involve,
for the most part, the influence of professionally informed investors
(active institutional investors), who pay for the best-available analysis and
advice.44 For some time, sociologists and organizational behavior scholars
have believed that companies often successfully use sleights of hand to
mislead investors,45 to which the dismissive response from financial
economists (if they paid attention to the work at all) was that such
credulousness could not possibly survive the rigors of market discipline.
Courts might thus be excused for assuming that these professionals are
always the aforementioned utility maximizers, thoroughly immune to
puffery or cheap talk.46
Today, however, there is greater inclination to accept that market
imperfections are persistent. Though well-oiled markets surely remain
the best available source of valuation even with these imperfections,
One could take this a step further and ask why any truly savvy person would ever rely on anything
said by someone with conflicting interests, absent some form of proof? (This, of course, is the
economist’s famous “lemons problem”). The law of fraud is an entitlement that invites and protects
reliance in the face of doubts about credibility, thereby lowering transaction costs.
44 The classic article on the subject is Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984); more recently, see Ronald Gilson & Reinier Krakkman, Market
Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313 (2014).
45 E.g., James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance
Reforms and Shareholder Reactions, 43 Admin. Sci.Q. 127 (1998).
46 On the tendency of earlier courts to invoke unrealistically demanding views of market efficiency in
fraud-on-the-market cases, see Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra.
43

15

Draft: 1/19/2018

market efficiency is viewed more as an idealized goal than descriptive
reality, largely because of high information costs.47 Even professional
investors have limited resources and capacity for attention,48 and use
short-cuts to optimize their valuation models, not try to perfect them. As
Andrew Lo puts it, markets may be adaptively efficient in that they
continuously learn and hence improve toward the ideal, but repeatedly
fall short in an always-changing and costly informational environment.49
This subject has received considerable scholarly attention in both law and
finance, and made its way into the arguments before the Supreme Court
in 2014 on whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was
still viable. (In Halliburton II, the Court said it was.50)
That more realistic approach, however, doesn’t by itself prove that
wordplay matters. Highly relevant but less familiar to lawyers, however,
is a fast-emerging body of research in financial economics on the role of
language in corporate disclosure. The impetus for this empirical work is
the desire to improve the prediction of both good and bad futures for
issuers via machine learning that looks for clues in how they speak to
investors—tone, use of key words, length of sentences, focal points,
etc.—separate and distinct from the hard information explicitly contained
in the disclosures like the latest earnings per share.51 For example, a shift
over time to less readability (signaling obfuscation) correlates with a drop
in later financial performance even though nothing actually said in the
disclosures warned of the reasons for that decline.52
One important message of this work is that ordinary language indeed
matters more than we had thought. Of course, the empirical findings give
There is also considerable interest in the possibility that behavioral biases may influence market
prices. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002).
48 See David Hirshleifer et al., Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News,
64 J. Fin. 2289 (2009).
49 Andrew Lo, Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, 7 J.
Inv. Consult. 21 (2005).
50 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2389 (2014). The Court explicitly said that
imperfect efficiency is not inconsistent with the reasons for the presumption of reliance in wellorganized markets.
51 A good survey of this work is Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Textual Analysis in Accounting and
Finance: A Survey, 54 J. Acct. Res. 1187 (2016).
52 E.g., Gerard Hoberg & Craig Lewis, Do Fraudulent Firms Produce Abnormal Disclosure?, 43 J. Corp. Fin.
58 (2017); see also Xuan Huang et al., Tone Management, 89 Acct. Rev. 1083 (2014); David Larcker &
A. Zarolyurina, Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls, 50 J. Acct. Res. 495 (2012); Jonathan
Rogers et al., Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation, 86 Acct. Rev. 2155 (2011).
47
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sophisticated investors new arbitrage opportunities to erode these
effects,53 and so this work has become of substantial interest as an
algorithmic tool.54 On the other hand, it also demonstrates that the
market is susceptible to language-based impression management.
Wording, syntax, hyperbole, euphemisms,55 tone etc. influence investors
and prices, though how much and for how long will vary. There is
evidence that market prices underreact to the reality revealed by such
cues, so that the price effects of deception continue over time.56
A plausible explanation for this, taking us back to our discussion of
implicature, is that sophisticated investors use management credibility as a
common heuristic to simplify their task. There is ample evidence that
credibility is a variable in the fundamental valuation calculus; over time
investors form impressions of how reliable managers are and act
accordingly. (This is one reason for stock price drops in the aftermath of
disaster that seem to exceed the fundamental value of the bad news in
question—they reflect a downward revision of credibility as well, calling
into question other value assumptions as well.57) When credibility is high
based on prior experience, even general optimism can be influential when
it responds to some matter on which management has exclusive
knowledge. So if management is asked how the current quarter is shaping
up compared to last year, “fine” (or “beautifully”) could mislead if the
truth was substantially at odds. And merely warning that the future is
unpredictable and that things could go awry would not undermine the
value of a revenue estimate when there is high credibility. Unfortunately,
looming disasters often enough cause previously credible managers to
There is substantial evidence, for example, at sophisticated analysts pick up on tone “tips and tells.”
See Marina Druz et al., Reading Managerial Tone: How Analysts and the Market Respond to Conference Calls
(NBER working paper, Jan. 2016). Presumably this arbitrage will improve pricing in light of what the
cures reveal, though one wonders whether managers, too, will change their language in response.
54 Recent advances in algorithmic trading apply syntax and tone assessments to various forms of news
releases to trigger high-speed trades. For an expression of concern about this kind of trading, see Yesha
Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Financial Markets, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1607 (2015).
Not surprisingly, the SEC is interested in the work as well as a tool for the early identification of fraud
risk.
55 See Kate Suslava, “Stiff Business Headwinds and Uncharted Economic Waters:” The Use of Euphemisms in
Earnings Conference Calls, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876819
(July 17, 2017).
56 See Joshua Lee, Can Investors Detect Managers’ Lack of Spontaneity?: Adherence to Predetermined Scripts
During Earnings Conference Calls, 91 Acct. Rev. 229 (2016); see also Huang et al., supra, uncovering
strong evidence that tone misinforms market actors.
57 See pp. --- infra.
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spend, if not waste, their reputational capital in order to avoid blame.
Nor must such deception necessarily be intentional: there are non-verbal
cues in managerial communications that signal cognitive dissonance (the
unconscious discomfort of seeking to reconcile prior beliefs and
commitments with new disconfirming information).58
Hiding behind euphemisms, puffery or what might be technically true
but nonetheless misleading can be especially pernicious. Ample evidence
shows that people tend to believe that such “artful paltering” is less
objectionable than making a positive misrepresentation—in other words,
the internal norms that warn us not to lie are weaker with respect to halftruths. Thus “individuals may deceive both more frequently and more
effectively by paltering than using lies of commission or omission.”59 If
language does matter, courts should be especially alert for such
temptations, particularly when disaster threatens, and certainly not
assume them away.

2. Normative Guidance

We’ve now seen that there are problems in simply assuming away the
influence of soft language, particularly in world where credibility matters.
But none of this tells courts what to do instead. To me, the essential
starting point is to acknowledge that the goal in fraud-on-the-market
cases is not about predicting how investors respond to words. Rather,
the remedy is an entitlement given to investors in order to facilitate
reliance even where it might be palpably risky given asymmetric
information and the arms-length nature of the bargain. It is more about
right to rely than but-for causation. This idea underlies the fraud-on-themarket presumption as what I have described as an offering of “juristic
grace.”60 The Supreme Court in both Basic and Halliburton II affords
investors a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the prevailing
market price (i.e., that it is undistorted by fraud) not because smart
See Jessen L. Hobson et al., Analyzing Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting, 50 J. Acct. Res. 349
(2012).
59 Todd Rogers et al., Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements to Mislead Others,
112 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 456 (2016).
60 See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra.
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investors naively assume management integrity, but because offering it
stimulates socially valuable investment in the face of risk.61
We can see this normative turn in other Supreme Court decisions as
well. In the Virginia Bankshares case,62 the defense claimed that smart
investors never rely on statements of opinion by boards of directors,
especially when the board was chosen by the interested party to a
transaction, a controlling shareholder. But they certainly have a right to,
said the Court, given the board’s superior access to information and the
norms of fiduciary responsibility. And more recently in Omnicare,63 the
argument was made that statements of opinion surely convey nothing to
the cautious investor beyond the honesty of the underlying belief, if that.
But the Court rejected the argument and opened the door for plaintiffs to
draw inferences from what was said that go beyond the strict textual
confines of the words used, thereby weakening what had been a powerful
defense tactic embraced by many lower courts.64
So predicting simply what savvy investors do or don’t believe isn’t
really the right approach in the first place, even if it is knowable. But what
is, beyond saying that the focus should be on facilitating reliance of the
sort that merits encouragement and protection, including some degree of
reliance on credibility? Omnicare offers a useful starting point, but
ultimately reduces the inquiry to a factual question on propensity to
mislead on which, it assumes, lower courts have ample experience and
expertise. Its exegesis was thus fairly limited in terms of guidance for
future cases (or even the one at hand), and can be read as either
encouraging, restrictive or both in terms of the scope of the half-truth
doctrine as applied to statements of opinion. 65
See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke
L.J. 711 (2006).
62 Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
63 Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318 (2015).
64 E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011)(no liability for any form of
opinion absent evidence of subjective disbelief). The Second Circuit has acknowledged that Fait’s per se
holding does not stand after Omnicare. See Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2016).
65 135 S.Ct. at 1332 (showing an actionable omission is “no small task for an investor”). Sadly, too
many lower courts have taken that particular language in the Court’s opinion as encouragement to hold
onto their overly rigid pre-Omnicare ways even though invited to think more expansively. For surveys
of Omnicare and its aftermath, see Robert A. Van Kirk & John S. Williams, The Supreme Court’s Decision
in Omnicare: The View from Two Years Out, 49 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (Bloomberg) 1264 (Aug. 7, 2017);
Sale & Langevoort, supra, at 779-80.
61
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Based on all the foregoing, there are some useful first principles from
which to derive an approach to interpretation in disaster cases. The
fraud-on-the-market theory is focused on price distortion, which includes
price maintenance as well as price movement in response to what was said
and not said. Price formation is a product of a reasonably sophisticated
“conversation” that goes on continuously among the issuer’s management
and a diverse set of investors, in which credibility varies and plays a key
role. Participants draw meaning from the issuer’s representations in this
expansive context. From that, it seems to me, courts should use the
cooperation principle as the presumptive background norm for
interpretation: normally (but not always) soft words and phrases should
be read as intended to help guide investors toward accurate inferences
about value and risk, not as gamesmanship about which to be skeptical.
This is not cause to dumb down the standard for a right to rely to the
most unsophisticated investor. Some of the heuristic principles courts
have used in fraud-on-the-market cases are perfectly sound in this light.
For example, such investors can fairly be held to draw from other
information readily available in the public domain in forming impressions,
so that they shouldn’t expect to be told what is already readily findable.66
Or, as the Court stressed in Omnicare, the careful use of words like “in our
opinion” naturally send a cautionary note that distinguishes such a message
from one that is totally unqualified.
Crucially, the setting in which the communication is made matters.
In Omnicare, the fact that the opinion about legal compliance was made in
a registration statement signaled that it was the product of the intense
labor and scrutiny that comes with due diligence in a registered public
offering.67 Such words signal that they derive from a particularly rigorous
process of information-elicitation, and thus convey more than a top of the
head opinion.68 An executive tweet would probably be the opposite,
conveying informality. That doesn’t mean it comes without implications;
just that the implications suggest some less rigor from which to draw
extended inferences.
For a case where finding the facts might have been possible but too difficult, in the court’s opinion,
see In re Massey Energy Co., Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597, 618-19 (S.D.W. Va. 2012).
67 Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1330.
68 Hillary Sale and I argue elsewhere that the Securities Exchange Act disclosure process is much closer
to the Securities Act than different from it, so that a comparable inference is fair for the public company
reporting process generally. Sale & Langevoort, supra, at 782.
66
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Attention to context and background norms sounds obvious in setting
principles of inference, but a careful review of the case law shows how
often courts operate differently.69
As noted earlier, quite a few
commentators have taken courts to task for their approach to the puffery
defense. And indeed, many courts act as if there is a dictionary of words
and phrases that everyone understands lack communicative content. But
that is questionable, even though we might agree that sometimes the
proper inference is that one is not being told anything of importance. If,
for example, the corporate communication responds to a legitimate
question with a positive generality and there is no obvious means for
further clarification, the implication should at least be that the hidden
truth is not thoroughly bad.70 So, too, with half-truths. The worse the
news is that is unrevealed, the less fair it is to opportunistically use literal
truth as a means to conceal, especially if the matter has already sparked
investor interest.71
This connects to the main issue in so many disaster cases—the extent
to which the statements made put the fact that was concealed sufficiently
“in play” that the duty to disclose applies. Merely touching on a subject
does not put it in play, nor does the simple fact that a code of ethics or
some other general statement promises a commitment to integrity.72 But
if the apparent motivation for what is said, however soft, was to respond
to a matter of palpable interest to investors but hide a harsher truth, the
case for deception strengthens. Those courts that find an issue to be in
play by reference to how many time the issuer repeated the soft
assurances are right to do so.73 The same with evidence showing high
levels of investor interest in a matter (i.e., oil rig safety). These
Indeed, the idea that plaintiffs’ allegations of misrepresentation must be analyzed one-by-one in
isolation is inconsistent with a common sense approach to inference in context.
70 See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1997).
71 I explored the connections among puffery, contextualism and half-truth in Langevoort, Half-Truths,
supra. More recently, see Cox, supra; Sale & Langevoort, supra, at 779; Lipton, supra, at 140-41.
72 For a good discussion of the case law here, with an acknowledgement that the general principle may
give way in a particular context, see In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 731, 754-57
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
73 In the pre-explosion portion of the Deepwater Horizon case, the court stressed how often BP
seemed to emphasize its vaunted safety procedures and processes without disclosing that they did not
fully apply to BP’s non-wholly owned assets. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2 600, 623 (S.D.
Tex. 2013). See also In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 3822755 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) at *10
(stressing commitment “over and over and over”); In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp.3d 368, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2015)(taking into account repeated efforts to parry and reassure investors in light of
growing concerns about compliance).
69

21

Draft: 1/19/2018

principles of inference in particular lead me to the impression that the
Ninth Circuit was wrong to dismiss the claims in the Hewlett-Packard
case, described earlier.74 While corporate ethics statements might be
deemed trivial to sophisticated investors in the abstract, the context to
the case seemed to be HP’s ability to emerge from its earlier governance
scandal, for which the strong leadership of its CEO, Mark Hurd, was
crucial. I see HP’s statements as a deliberate effort to assuage investor
unease and identify strength and integrity as strong points.75 If so, and
Hurd had gained credibility among analysts and investors, this
conversation thread may have mattered more than the court assumed, and
the failure to reveal the disdain and ethical risk-taking would be quite
consequential. As another court of appeals put it better in addressing this
same kind of issue, liability makes sense when there are statements by the
issuer “that emphasize its reputation for integrity or ethical conduct as
central to its financial condition or are clearly designed to distinguish the
company from other specified companies in the same industry.”76
A final—and admittedly more complicated—principle of inference
goes to the degree of voluntariness of the statement. This connects
closely to the “in play” idea just noted. Properly understood, what those
courts that find a duty seem to recognize is that when the disclosure is
unprompted and apparently quite voluntary, investors should be able to
infer that the issuer is motivated by a genuine desire to reveal, and hence
are entitled to draw broader inferences consistent with what is said
explicitly, especially if the issuer keeps insistently repeating a message for
emphasis. On the other hand, when an issuer makes a statement that
reflects that it does not really want to speak but is under pressure or
compulsion to do so, the investor should be more hesitant to draw strong
inferences regarding things unsaid. This, as we will see shortly, arises
especially with respect to legal compliance.

C. Reporting Obligations and Line-item Disclosures
See note --- supra.
The court acknowledges that Hurd led a charge to change perceptions of HP’s integrity and conduct
norms after the earlier scandal, and says that it would have been a closer case had the sexual scandal
been more closely related to the prior governance scandal. 845 F.3d at 1278.
76 Indiana Public Ret. System v. SAIC Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2016).
74
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As noted, courts today are insistent that broad disclosure duties are
for the SEC or Congress for formulate, not for the courts to invent.77
Thus, in search of liability for pre-disaster concealment plaintiffs naturally
look to the numerous line-items, mostly found in the SEC’s Regulation SK, that impose a requirement to reveal information investors supposedly
want and need via periodic filings that are (almost) instantly made
available on the internet. Buttressing this is the Commission’s own halftruth rule, forcing issuers to add further material information necessary to
make the responses complete.
This route has many obstacles. Reg S-K is extensive and dense,
enough so that both Congress and the SEC are currently seeking to prune
it.78 Yet what is striking about these line-item requirements is how much
potentially material information is not subject to any disclosure obligation.
Many have pointed out how poorly the current mandatory disclosure
regime speaks to issues relation to the modern corporation, especially as
to opportunities and risk relating to intellectual property and human
capital.79 What they have done operate mainly with a short to medium
term horizon, even though many long-term investors and sustainability
proponents want and need a longer outlook.80 The SEC long adhered to a
See Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir 2001)(“judges have no authority to
scoop the political branches and adopt continuous disclosure under the banner of Rule 10b-5”). The
SEC has adopted a specific half-truth prohibition for SEC filings under the Securities Exchange Act,
Rule 12b-20. There are two other fraud-based exceptions. The so-called “duty to correct” holds that if
the issuer previously made a misstatement but in good faith so that no liability follows, it nonetheless
has a duty to correct it when the truth is discovered. See id. The “duty to update” is accepted by some
courts but not others. See id.; Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1 st Cir. 1996). It holds that
an issuer must update an earlier statement that no longer is accurate even though it was when originally
made, if (but only if) the earlier statement implied to a reasonable investor that it could be relied upon
beyond the time of its making, i.e., was “still alive” in the marketplace. Though potentially powerful,
lawyers came to see that the duty to update could largely be disclaimed by stating in the original
disclosure that it spoke only to the moment, and that the issuer was assuming no duty to update. See,
e.g., Greenthal v. Joyce, 2916 WL 362312 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 29, 2016). As a result, duty to update
cases are less frequent today. But see Finnerty v. Stiefel Laboratories Inc., 756 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.
2014); In re Facebook IPO Litig., 986 F. Supp.2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
78 See Release No. 33-10064, April 13, 2016, at 204-10; Roberta Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC
is Riding Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 Bus. Law. 781 (2016).
79 See Baruch Lev, Evaluating Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 29 J. App. Corp. Fin. 70 (2017).
80 Other major countries around the world (in the European Union and Australia, most notably) have
more expansive corporate disclosure requirements See Dale Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a
Continuous Disclosure Obligation for Publicly-Traded Companies: Are We There Yet?, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 135
(1998).
77
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policy limiting disclosure to historical, backwards-looking, facts, not
forward-looking information even though that is the more value-relevant
to investors; the effects of this are still felt today. Another purported
explanation is clarity: giving issuers and their lawyers more definition in
what disclosure is required, to avoid even more overload. But deeper
than these is an uneasy recognition of the need for corporate secrecy on
many matters, especially forward-looking ones, lest the company be
hampered in its ability to compete, or not invest in strategies or products
whose value would disappear if the information was publicly available to
competitors and others. Unfortunately, the effect of a duty limited to
line item instructions is to offer this zone of secrecy whether or not there
are truly good reasons for it as to particular facts or fears. The pressure
from investors for more extensive voluntary disclosures stems from these
limits.
Two line-item requirements are most often invoked by plaintiffs in
disaster cases in their effort to find actionable omissions.81 One, found in
the instructions to the 10-K and 10-Q, seems particularly promising:
companies have to identify the most significant risk factors they face,
updated on a quarterly basis.82 But this has turned out to be disappointing
as an early warning device for a handful of reasons. First, and most
importantly, it requires identification, but not assessment—that is,
describing kinds of risk, but not explicitly requiring discussion of either
probability that they will come to pass or impact on the company if they
do. The disclosures can easily devolve to boilerplate, offering a recitation
of risks the majority of which an intelligent investor could surmise even
without the disclosure. This is not to say that the risk disclosure line item
is worthless.83 Careful readers of an issuer’s SEC filings can notice
changes from quarter to quarter that signal the emergence of something
that caused its lawyers to add to the recitation, suggesting that the level of
These are not the only possible line items, but they are the most likely to relate to a concealed risk.
As to corporate governance, the SEC has a specific requirement to describe the extent of the board of
directors’ role in risk management, and how it undertakes that role. See Item 407(h) of Regulation SK.
82 The ’34 Act filing instructions cross-reference Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, which involves risk
disclosures in public offerings.
83 See A.C. Pritchard & Karen Nelson, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from Voluntary to Mandatory Disclosure of
Risk Factors, 13 J. Emp. Leg. Studies 266 (2016); Ole-Kristian Hope et al., The Benefits of Specific Risk
Factor Disclosures, 21 Rev. Acct’g Studies 1005 (2016). In addition, the SEC staff comments on a filing
may draw attention to deficiencies and force the issuer to be more forthcoming.
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worry about that particular subject had risen. These sophisticated
investors can then follow up with questions to the company or do further
research. But the identification itself is little more than a potential
conversation starter, by itself revealing little about what might be a
looming, serious risk. Finally, like all quarterly reporting obligations, it is
not a real-time requirement triggered when the risk level increases, but
one that can wait for as many as ninety days.
Of more help is Item 303 of Reg S-K: management’s discussion and
analysis (the MD&A). In the eyes of the SEC, this is clearly meant as an
early warning device, designed to alert investors as to risks, trends and
uncertainties with respect to the conduct of business that might make it
unwise for investors to rely on past performance as a future indicator.84
The Commission staff has highlighted the MD&A as quite relevant to
disclosure of environmental risks,85 for example, as well as cybersecurity
and other hot button topics.86 As mentioned earlier, an emerging body of
empirical work using machine learning shows that the MD&A can be
important not only for what the issuer reveals explicitly (again, especially
changes from period to period) but how it “speaks.”87 Companies with
something to hide appear to change their tone, use longer and more
complex sentences, and seek to redirect reader attention away from the
sensitive topic. There is evidence that the obfuscation works.
The MD&A, however, is less than entirely reliable as an early
warning device.88 It has built-in limits, most importantly that the events,
trends and uncertainties have to be “known” to management and
“reasonably likely” to occur.89 Precisely what level of probability makes
See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations, SEC Rel. No. 33-8350 (2003).
85 See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Relating to Climate Change, SEC Release No. 339106 (Feb. 8, 2010).
86 SEC Div. of Corporation Finance, Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2 (Oct. 13, 2011). The SEC is
elevating the importance of cybersecurity, both as to disclosure and threats to customer and employee
data privacy. See SEC May Refresh Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, 49 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (Bloomberg)
1809 (Nov. 20, 2017).
87 See pp. --- infra.
88 See Stephen Brown & Jennifer Wu Tucker, Large Sample Evidence on Firm’s Year-to-Year MD&A
Modifications, 49 J. Acct. Res. 309 (2011).
89 See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1245
(2003)(describing scuttled plans to alter the “reasonably likely” standard). In the Fudao dam case
otherwise allowed to go forward for fraudulent misstatements and omissions in its voluntary
disclosures, the court rejected plaintiffs’ Item 303 claim for lack of sufficient knowledge of a reasonably
likely event. See In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 3822755 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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something reasonably likely has been debated for decades, without
closure, but surely leaves room for management to determine that
something, however worrisome, hasn’t yet met that subjective threshold.
The knowledge requirement can also be troublesome with respect to the
kind of risk-related information that gets diffused, distorted or suppressed
within the corporate bureaucracy.
Given the soft spots in the MD&A structure, its efficacy depends on
enforcement intensity.90 The SEC does indeed stress MD&A compliance
in comment letters and public statements, but enforcement seems
somewhat muted. Cases tend to be settled on cease and desist-type
terms, without large sanctions. SEC officials have long complained about
the quality of MD&A disclosures. That takes us back to our main subject
here, the fraud-on-the-market action, which can put a much larger pricetag on issuer non-compliance.
There is an apparent split of authority in the circuits about whether
private plaintiffs can invoke Item 303 (or indeed, any line-item
requirement) to argue that its violation gives rise to damages, on which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in early 2017 but then withdrew
the grant at the request of the parties when the case was settled.91 That
is, does the MD&A mandate establish a duty to disclose, the breach of
which creates a 10b-5 violation assuming that plaintiffs satisfy all the other
elements of the cause of action, including materiality and scienter? The
negative view is that SEC line-items create no independent private right
of action, but instead are left entirely to SEC enforcement. While that is
certainly true, it misses the point. To me, the answer to the duty
question is fairly easy.92 Surely a blatant lie in the MD&A would be
For doubts about the SEC’s interest in environmental disclosure enforcement, see David W. Case,
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 379 (2005). For an illustration of enforcement failure undermining the intentions for creating
the disclosure in the first place, see Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in
Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
91 On the apparent split, compare, for example, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103
(2d Cir. 2015)(does create a duty) with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 454, 465 (9 th Cir.
2014)(does not). The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was in Indiana Pub. Ret. System v. SAIC
Inc., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Leidos Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. System, 137
S.Ct. 1395 (2017). For an argument that the impression of a circuit split is largely illusory, see
Matthew Turk & Karen Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law,
July 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996555.
92 See Langevoort & Gulati, supra, at 1680-81. But see Linda Griggs et al., When Rules Collide: Leidos,
the Supreme Court and the Risk to the MD&A, 49 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (Bloomberg) 1511 (Sept. 25, 2017).
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actionable fraud—no court has even suggested that a lie’s placement in a
10-K somehow takes it out of Rule 10b-5. Given this, we simply have to
invoke the familiar coupling: the Rule also prohibits misstatements and
omissions necessary to make what was said not misleading. So the
question comes down to whether intentionally failing to disclose
something called for by Item 303 would mislead a reasonable investor.
Assume that an issuer deliberately omits from the MD&A a serious
known risk for fear that its revelation would damage the company nearterm. Other risks, trends and uncertainties are fully discussed. Would a
reasonable investor infer from what is said that no other matters were
required to be disclosed as per SEC instructions, so that we have the
“omission of a material fact necessary to make statements made not
misleading”? Ordinarily, yes. As courts have stressed, SEC rule-making
is authoritative on what public companies have to disclose and investors
are the intended beneficiaries of the mandate. It follows that investors
should be entitled to assume compliance unless on notice otherwise. The
duty element would thus be satisfied.93
Without such a rule, there would be a severe enforcement gap with
respect the MD&A, one that could severely reduce its efficacy as an early
warning device. But even if the Court does what it should, enforcement
intensity as to Item 303 is at best moderate, because of the built-in limits,
the scienter requirement, and the various reasons that private class actions
deliver imperfect deterrence when managers have selfish reasons to
obfuscate but bear little personal risk of liability. That said, the evidence
supports an inference that private securities litigation adds a needed dose
of deterrence to SEC enforcement,94 so that those worried about
corporate candor with respect to disaster risk should pay close attention
to future battling about the duty issue.

Id. This would be different if the issuer made clear that it was not responding fully and completely,
but that, of course, would not set well with the SEC.
94 For discussions of the deterrence value of fraud-on-the-market cases, see, e.g., Cox & Thomas,
supra; DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND
THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 53-56 (2016); Christopher F. Baum et al., Securities Fraud and
Corporate Board Turnover: New Evidence from Lawsuit Outcomes, 48 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 14 (2016); see also
Dain C. Donelson et al., The Role of D&O Insurance in Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements, 58 J. L. &
Econ. 747 (2015)(positive role of merits in influencing settlements).
93

27

Draft: 1/19/2018

D. The (Sometimes) Frustrating Statutory Safe Harbor

In developing an approach to corporate implicature for fraud-on-themarket cases, we have so far ignored a powerful statutory innovation
created in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1996 that is
much put to use in disaster litigation. The so-called safe harbor for
forward-looking information declares on its face that such information is
not fraud for purposes of private securities litigation if either made
without actual fraudulent intent or accompanied by “meaningful
cautionary language” that warns investors of the risk that the forwardlooking information may not come to pass as predicted. This was a
codification of a judge-made “bespeaks caution” doctrine, albeit without
the nuance some courts had brought to application of that principle.95
When the issuer speaks to the future in addressing risks or lack thereof,
the invitation is to add a disclaimer drawing investors’ attention to risk
factors—usually, the same risk factors already set forth in the 10-K or Q
as per the line-item instructions discussed above—that could affect the
likelihood of whatever future circumstance the issuer is addressing. If this
works, the risk of liability disappears.96 The potency of the safe harbor is
obvious in pre-crisis disaster cases because what is being challenged is
often a forward-looking risk assessment.
In terms of disclosure theory and practice, the safe harbor is a nearabsurdity. Imagine that an issuer were to make a statement that its
assessment of a catastrophic failure at a power plant was that it was highly
unlikely. In fact, there is private evidence of internal doubts about the
accuracy of the risk assessment. That would be false and misleading. And
it would be none the less so if the issuer added a disclaimer pointing to
some risk factors. This is the same point made about risk factor
disclosure—it is of limited use if it fails to reveal internal probability
estimates and simply states that the bad event is possible. What is
important is management’s determination that the event is highly

See Langevoort, Bespeaks Caution, supra.
See Nelson & Pritchard, supra; Ann Morales Olazabal, False Forward Looking Information and the
PSLRA’s Safe Harbor, 86 Ind. L.J. 596 (2011).
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unlikely, assuming that it has a reputation for credibility.97 Otherwise,
the warning is just noise.98
But because the protection is a statutory command, absurdity doesn’t
matter. At best, the statutory safe harbor is a trade-off: effective
immunization of forward-looking information from liability in order to
encourage honest disclosures that would otherwise not be made because
of fear of liability. The empirical literature on the safe harbor is mixed as
to whether the trade is a good one.99
There is some good news, however, in the contextualism that many
courts bring to the two interpretive questions that often come up in
deciding whether the safe harbor protects some alleged falsity. One is
whether the issuer is truly speaking to the future or instead—fully or
partially—addressing the present, which eliminates the statutory
protection entirely.100 This is an exercise in implicature, because there
are many statements that appear forward-looking on their face but also
either say or imply something about current conditions. The other
interpretive question is whether the cautionary language is sufficiently
meaningful. Particularly striking here is the eagerness some courts
demonstrate to consider whether the cautionary language itself might be
misleading, for suggesting that the predicted risk is merely possible when
management knows privately that it is actually coming to pass.101 So

See Jonathan L. Rogers & Phillip C. Stocken, Credibility of Management Forecasts, 80 Acct. Rev. 1233
(2005).
98 On investors’ perception of having been wronged in the face of cautionary language, see H. Scott
Asay & Jeffrey Hales, Disclaiming the Future: Investigating the Impact of Cautionary Disclaimers on Investor
Judgments Before and After Experiencing Economic Loss, Sept. 2017, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573333.
99 For a good summary of costs and benefits, see Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities
Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. Acct’g Res.
297 (2001)(more disclosure but diminished accuracy).
100 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor’s Rocky Shore, 39 Sec. Reg. L.J. 257
(2011). On the distinction between present and forward-looking information when the two are
bundled, see In re Quality Systems Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2017)(no protection for the
non-forward looking parts of the bundle).
101 E.g., Slayton v. American Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 770 (2d Cir. 2010); Arkansas Pub. Emp.
Ret. System v. Harman Int’l Indus. Inc., 791 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In Loritz v. Exide
Technologies Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 98,142 (C.D. Cal. 2014), the court observed that a
warning that the corporation could not be sure that it “has been, or will be at all times, in complete
compliance with all environmental requirements” was not meaningful enough when it knew of
significant environmental exposure.
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although the safe harbor is indeed a frequent obstacle for plaintiffs in
disaster cases, it is not quite as forbidding as it might at first seem.

II. GETTING CLOSER: GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
CRIMINALITY

AND

UNCHARGED

A. Investigations and Regulatory Proceedings

Further along the disclosure timeline in the run-up to a corporate
disaster, there may be allegations made by plaintiffs that the issuer
concealed the occurrence of some governmental investigation that was
triggered by suspicion that something was wrong, or a routine inspection
finding something amiss. These are particularly common, of course, with
respect to compliance disasters. Such governmental inquiries are part of
the administrative state: they can be regulatory or criminal in nature, and
at varying stages of formality and cause for concern. When the following
weeks or months bring a large-scale criminal prosecution or regulatory
fine imposed on the issuer, there is a natural temptation to see the
undisclosed investigation as a fraudulently concealed risk.
There is a substantial body of case law on the materiality of
unpublicized government investigations, which turns on the probability
that the case will turn serious in terms of its implications for the issuer
and the magnitude of the impact (in terms of fines, loss of business,
disqualifications, etc.) if it does.102 These are hardly easy calculations, but
one can imagine many situations where the threat emanating from an
investigation tilts in favor of materiality even if the matter is far from
resolved and might never result in any enforcement action or prosecution
at all.
See David Stuart & David Wilson, Disclosure Obligations Under the Federal Securities Laws in Government
Investigations, 64 Bus. Law. 973 (2009); see also Jonathan N. Eisenberg, Are Public Companies Required to
Disclose Government Investigations?, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/22/arepublic-companies-required-to-disclose-government-investigations/ (July 22, 2015). The “probabilitymagnitude” test was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988);
see generally COX ET AL., supra, at 628-31.
102

30

Draft: 1/19/2018

But again, there is no per se duty to disclose an investigation even if
deemed material, though my impression is that many practitioners say
that they nonetheless urge clients disclose voluntarily. Whether there is a
duty depends partially on what we have already surveyed. As to
mandatory disclosure in SEC filings, is this a new risk factor or something
that triggers the need for comment in the MD&A? If so, duty kicks in as
per our earlier discussion. But there is more specific line-item to
consider. Item 103 requires a brief description of any material pending
non-routine legal proceedings against the issuer or one of its subsidiaries.
To this is added, somewhat ominously, similar disclosure as to “any such
proceeding known to be contemplated by government authorities.”
Beyond these familiar line-items, there are some particularized
enhancements to the disclosure duty with respect to proceedings
involving allegations of environmental law violations, which was part of
an understanding reached between the SEC and environmental activists
back in the 1970s. Of more recent vintage, there are special rules on the
disclosure of both pending and resolved enforcement actions taken by the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission against mining
companies that are ’34 Act registrants. This additional mine safety
disclosure is noteworthy; researchers have found evidence that the
addition in 2011 of this new public form of disclosure resulted in a
noticeable reduction in safety violations, deaths and injuries—that is, a
higher level of care—even though this data was already known to mine
safety regulators and discoverable (albeit with considerable effort) online.103 It is a pointed reminder that the benefits from public company
disclosure are not simply from making the issuer’s stock price more
accurate, and often as much about influencing behavior as generating
information.
Courts, however, seem surprisingly reluctant to invoke the generic
line-item requirements to compel disclosure of investigations, especially
when issuers have made boilerplate risk factor disclosure pointing out the
inevitable risks highly regulated companies face with respect to legal
compliance.104 To be sure, as many courts have said, the mere fact of an
investigation triggers none of the line items. But once government
See Hans Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosures in Financial
Statements, 64 J. Acct. & Econ. 284 (2017).
104 This reluctance is sometimes justified by reference to the regulatory agency’s own policy (e.g., at
the SEC) of treating its enforcement investigations as confidential.
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enforcers indicate that an action is likely, that would seem to at least
satisfy Item 103’s “known to be contemplated” language. Curiously,
courts have found their way to saying that that phrase requires disclosure
only of actions “substantially certain to occur.”105 To an issuer busily
trying to persuade the government not to act or to impose only minor
sanctions, this truncates the duty considerably. The MD&A and risk
factor disclosure have not fared that well as triggers for a duty to reveal
investigations, either.
Once again, half-truth once again seems to be the doctrine of choice
for resolving these cases, especially when what plaintiffs want revealed is
not just the fact of the investigation but an assessment of its seriousness as
of the time of the disclosure. This implicates the background norm set
forth earlier about matters of special sensitivity, and may be a place where
the presumption of cooperativeness in drawing inferences is less
justifiable. Legal risk is something on which companies cannot speak in
depth without revealing too much of its hand in the on-going negotiations
with regulators. While merely disclosing that an enforcement action is
possible does not necessarily compromise a negotiating position, it is hard
for the company to stop there. Stakeholders will ask for an assessment of
claims and defenses, which is fraught territory. As suggested, it is
probably fair to say that the response as to both the possibility and impact
of an investigation will be grudging and cautious, with no reason for
investors to draw strong inferences one way or the other about things not
said. In the last few years, a notable handful of cases—enthusiastically
welcomed by the defense bar and their clients—have rejected omission
claims arising out of undisclosed, or minimally disclosed,
investigations.106
Issuers and their lawyers often try to finesse the nondisclosure of some
pending investigation by saying something like “we are not aware of any
pending government investigations that in our view would have a material
impact on the company or its operations.” They are hoping that the
investigation will not in fact lead to a material sanction; if it does, they
will say that they misestimated in good faith, latching onto phrases like “in
E.g., Richman v. Goldman Sachs, 868 F. Supp.2d 261, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Lion’s Gate
Ent. Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp.3d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
106 See Lion’s Gate, supra.; see also Lubbers v. Flagstar Bancorp. Inc., 162 F. Supp.3d 571 (E.D. Mich.
2016); In re Investment Technology Group Sec. Litig. 2017 WL 1498055 (S.D.N.Y., April 26, 2017).
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our view,” “we expect,” or similar equivocations, invoking a legacy from
the pre-Omnicare days when courts reflexively protected statements of
opinion absent evidence of deliberate deceit. Invoking the norm of fair
play referred to earlier, some judges have recently shown a willingness to
declare such statements to be potential half-truths when what was
undisclosed was a palpably serious threat, even though the extent of the
threat was indeterminate at the time, and maybe even still.107

B. Illegality

Almost by definition, compliance-related corporate catastrophes are
produced by an investigation that, eventually at least, uncovers evidence
of some kind of pre-existing illegality on which the government brings
charges. In that case, plaintiffs can point not only to the concealed
investigation but the hidden fact of the underlying wrongdoing itself as a
possible fraud. If the argument succeeds,108 this locates the scheme to
defraud further back in time, enlarging the plaintiff class. But here, too,
courts are often quick to say that silence—whether about illegality or
anything else—is not fraudulent without showing that a duty was
breached.109
These are particularly hard cases for plaintiffs when there was no
admission by the issuer of its wrongdoing or finding of such by a court or
agency. Courts are not particularly anxious to undertake a case-within-acase that requires litigation of the fact of the underlying misconduct
followed by a determination of whether the nondisclosure was fraudulent
in light of that fact. They thus impose a high level of particularized
pleading in support of the illegality. But legal disaster cases are usually
ones where the government has already done the heavy lifting on the
illegality of what transpired, and the issuer may be precluded from
denying the wrongdoing after a plea or non-prosecution deal. That
The most notable case here is Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Group LLC, 164 F. Supp.3d 568
(S.D.N.Y. 2016). See also In re BioScrip Inc. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp.3d 711, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); In
re FBR Sec. Litig., 544 F. Supp.2d 346, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
108 For an overview of possibilities, see Alison B. Miller, Note, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma:
Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws, 102 Geo. L.J. 1647 (2014).
109 See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir 1987).
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obviously strengthens plaintiffs’ claim. Even then, however, many judges
seem reluctant to make liability turn on the company’s failure to disclose
its own wrongdoing.110 They often cite case law saying that the securities
disclosure is not “a rite of confession,”111 nor meant to force selfincrimination.112
Most courts understand that corporations cannot lie about compliance,
nor (as the Supreme Court specifically addressed in Omnicare) make
affirmative statements about law-abidingness that may literally be true but
misleading because of what wasn’t said. But even here, many courts still
seem skeptical.113 Take a situation where a pattern of bribery enabled a
significant (i.e., material) amount of revenues during the most recent
fiscal period, thereby boosting earnings per share over what they would
have been or indicating fast growth for the firm. It would seem obvious
that omitting the fact of the illegality makes the reported financial results
misleading. Yet most courts say just the opposite: “the allegation that a
corporation properly reported income that is alleged to have been, in
part, improperly obtained is insufficient to impose Section 10(b)
liability.”114 That is especially jarring given the well-established principle
in criminal cases that compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles does not necessarily protect against a claim of fraud.115 For
better or worse, it usually takes more to cross the line, as with repeated
touting of a commitment to compliance in the face of a pervasive criminal
scheme116 or where the issuer puts its competitive success at issue without
For good discussions, see the Menaldi case, supra, and In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d
731 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
111 City of Pontiac Ret. System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2014).
112 Id.; see also United States v. Mathews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
113 Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Group LLC, 164 F. Supp.3d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)(finding the
statements about transparency and risk management commitments too vague). See also id., 2017 WL
4386902 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 2017)(same). For a thorough discussion of how Omnicare affects the law
here, see In re BioScrip Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp.3d 711, 728-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(finding statements to
be potentially misleading).
114 In re Marsh & McLennan Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp.2d 452, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
115 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d
Cir. 2006).
116 See Meyer v. Jinksolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2014)(finding potential for deception in
description of compliance program if there was a known failure to prevent on-going pollution
problems. The bigger the hidden wrongdoing, moreover, the more likely it seems that a court will find
enough evidence of deception. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal., July 19, 2017). There the court agreed with plaintiffs that the
company’s statements such as that reducing emissions was a top research and development priority and
risk factor disclosures were misleading because they omitted “the massive defeat device scheme.”
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revealing that a material reason for the apparent success was the
wrongdoing.117 In other words, something close to an well-crafted
scheme to defraud.118
No doubt there are reasons for the courts’ hesitancy, even if
corporations have no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Some reasons are better than others. Possibly it is because any such
mandatory disclosure seems almost futile, on the assumption that few
issuers will actually reveal their secret criminality in a timely fashion even
with the most explicit duty to disclose. But that is not quite right, for
there are many regulatory regimes that require self-reporting of illegal
behavior with significant rates of compliance—in a well governed
corporation, discovery of wrongdoing should lead to immediate efforts at
remediation, not an inevitable cover-up. And even if it does not actually
generate disclosure because management directs a cover-up, a securities
lawsuit at least allows compensation for those deceived, and potentially
deters the underlying misconduct to the extent that an additional
powerful sanction is added to the enforcement mix.
A better reason for the heightened sensitivity here has to do with the
inherent subjectivity of law. Relatively few legal disaster cases are ones
where there was absolutely no doubt about illegality; ordinarily, there
would be contestable fact questions and legal defenses available to the
company. Most large corporate criminal and regulatory cases are
resolved without adjudication, with insiders probably often believing that
they would (or at least should) prevail at trial but unwilling to bear the
costs and risks. The disclosure obligation, moreover, comes at an earlier
See In re Van der Moolen Holding NV Sec. Litig, 405 F. Supp.2d 388, 400-01(S.D.N.Y.
2005)(illegal trading revenues); In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 751, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y.
2017)(statements about pricing for a particular product misleading for failure to disclose bribes). For a
case finding the potential for deception in both generalized stress on a commitment to safety and
reliance on a particular metric that it tried to game even if the numbers might have been technically
accurate, see In re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597 (S.D.W.V. 2012).
118 See Lipton, supra, at 132 (“At that point, it is not so much the company’s statements, but its
business model that acts as a fraud on shareholders”), citing cases in accord with this approach,
including Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 312 F.R.D. 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). See also In re Countrywide
Financial Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp.2d 1132, 1153-54(C.D. Cal. 2008). At some point in cases like this,
resort to “scheme liability” instead of the more common half-truth approach seems plausible. E.g.,
West Virginia Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v Medtronic Inc., 845 F.3d 384 (8 th Cir.
2016)(allowing case involving pay-offs to doctors authorized by pharmaceutical company to proceed
under scheme liability, thus obviating the need to focus entirely on the sequence of disclosures made by
the issuer). If followed elsewhere, Medtronic offers an interesting alternative to breathing life into the
duty to disclose.
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point in time, at which there is no concession of liability. As with
government investigations, disclosure isn’t terribly useful without a
candid risk assessment, which could compromise the company’s ability to
make or defend its case. So the background norm for implicature should
be the issuer’s strong desire to limit the risk of self-incrimination and not
reveal weaknesses that might be exploited by regulators, prosecutors,
competitors and the like. Investors should not liberally draw inferences
inconsistent with that desire, in other words, but instead understand that
the issuer is trying to manage a potentially risky situation without
prejudicing its defense.119 This is the one of the few areas in the world of
voluntary disclosure where the cooperativeness principle is something of
a misfit. Beyond that, however, courts should stop mindlessly repeating
the shibboleth that the securities laws are not meant to force disclosure of
mismanagement or wrongdoing.120 If both material and genuinely the
subject of deception, concealment claims about such matters deserve the
courts’ careful attention.

III. NARRATING THE DISASTER

A disaster often becomes public when announced by the corporation,
while other times the news comes first from some other source (e.g.,
government prosecutors, financial media) or is so publicly visible that it
needs no announcement. In any event, the company is now in crisis and
someone—or a team—will be expected to become the narrator and
speak on its behalf, addressing the nature and scope of the event, why it
happened, and most importantly, the consequences like to flow from it.
They know full well that millions (or billions) of dollars in liability risk
other consequences may depend on whether they are sufficiently candid
yet desperately not wanting to add to the conflagration or upset their
superiors by getting something wrong or disclosing too much.
There are numerous instances of firms handling such situations badly
enough that a court finds a triable issue of fraud. In the BP Deepwater
See Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra.
E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial
Accountability, 79 Wash. U.L.Q. 449 (2001).
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Horizon case, for example, the judge determined that the company’s
1000 barrel per day estimation of the “flow rate” of oil discharged into the
Gulf of Mexico in the days following the disaster—though not necessarily
implausible or in bad faith—could be misleading for failure to reveal
higher estimates generated by other internal or external
methodologies.121 Even though the Coast Guard and others were publicly
suggesting that the actual amount might be five times higher, BP could
have misled investors by projecting too much confidence in a figure it
kept trying to defend.122
Obviously, this is difficult terrain to travel. Public relations experts
usually advise firms in crisis to gain control of the story rather than let
others frame it. Many different stakeholders, not just investors, will be
vitally interested in what is said, perhaps inclined toward anger, fear or
panic. The natural desire is project a sense of confidence and control,
assuring others that the company and its management are on top of the
situation.123 The truth may be otherwise, of course, which makes this
phase so crucial in any fraud-on-the-market lawsuit. Behind the scenes
often lurk palpable uncertainty, fears about blame, and the challenges of
getting an unruly high-level team “on the same page” under severe time
pressure. What is said may turn out to be unduly optimistic, thus
becoming fodder for a lawsuit by purchasers who point to much more
harm than was initially indicated. Fear of liability may in turn cause the
company to truncate its disclosures, raising the risk of half-truth
accusations based on the misleading inadequacy of what was said. Yet
saying nothing is generally impracticable because the story has taken off
(in social as well as conventional media), others may be spinning it in
their own interests, and the risk of rumors and misinformation is
abundant.
In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 2016 WL 3090779 (S.D. Tex. 2016). The court was clearly influenced
by the Supreme Court’s then-recent Omnicare decision as enlarging the scope of duty to disclose
background facts that would alter the reasonable investor’s assessment of the degree of uncertainty and
likely state of affairs. It stressed the severe uncertainty under which all persons were acting, demanding
“a bespoke pattern [to disclosure] rather than a blanket approach.” Id. at *13.
122 The court said that it arguably “doubled down” on its original 1000 bpd figure. Id. at *14. Later on
the BP official expanded the range to somewhere between 1000 and 5000. The court suggested that it
should have stress the tentativeness of all the estimations rather than anchoring on a single point
estimate, which then became difficult to let go of.
123 E.g., Anastasya Zavyalova et al., Managing the Message: The Effect of Firm Actions and Industry Spillovers
on Media Coverage Following Wrongdoing, 55 Acad. Mgt. J. 1079 (2012).
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The law here is largely the same as what we have already covered.
While there may be SEC filings required in the midst of the crisis, they
are not likely to play as large a role. Indeed, most lawyers will advise
delaying the filing of a 10-K or Q if the situation is too fluid and uncertain
to draft something in which everyone is confident.124 The disclosures are
almost always legally “voluntary,” if not practically so, which makes the
half-truth doctrine predominant once again.
The background norms for implicature in a crisis setting are precisely
the opposite of what the Supreme Court described in Omnicare, where it
noted the diligence and deliberateness that goes into a filing
accompanying a public offering (or any other SEC filing). The company is
reacting to a bad event, under great pressure, and cannot be held to quite
the same heightened expectations as to candor or completeness. The
reasonable investor presumably understands that the truth is hard to
extract from a crisis situation, so that inferences should not too liberally
be drawn one way or the other from things deliberately not said or
affirmatively avoided. That said, at this stage we have may well have
hyper-materiality—exceptionally intense trading and investor interest in
what the company and others have to say, so that there must be a baseline
of candor and completeness on which reliance is invited. Courts are
walking another fine line, and as in BP, the decisions here tend to reject
narrations that are overly self-protective.125

IV. KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTIONALITY

A. Scienter and Corporate Awareness

If what was concealed was a lack of preparedness for or some
heightened risk of the disaster that came to pass, some person or persons
See SEC Rule 12b-25.
The Fundao dam cases also had a narration aspect to them, as both joint venturers initially stated
(falsely, according to the plaintiffs) that they were not in a position to be held derivatively liable for the
environmental damage and misrepresented other consequences of the dam failure. See In re Vale S.A.
Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1102666 (S.D.N.Y., March 23, 2017)(raising issues of materiality and loss
causation)
124
125
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in authority must have been aware of or ignored the propensity of what
was said or omitted to mislead investors. This is because Rule 10b-5
liability requires scienter—i.e., knowledge or recklessness. Pleading and
proving this is often heavy lifting for the plaintiffs’ lawyers, especially
because courts tend to see recklessness not as a heightened form of
negligence but rather something closer to willful ignorance or conscious
disregard.126
Disasters are often not easy to see coming until it is too late.127 There
are structural, psychological and political (agency cost) reasons for this,
which have been explored by many scholars in recent years, stimulated in
particular by the global financial crisis effectively foreseen by almost no
one.128 The structural reasons involve how information and responsibility
are diffused in large organizations—“siloed,” to use a familiar term—so
that the risk-related dots remain unconnected even as the situation turns
dangerous.129 The psychological reasons relate to the difficulty human
beings have in recognizing change—the so-called conservatism bias.130
That is all the more problematic when managers (or corporate cultures)
are overconfident or excessively optimistic,131 or motivated to deny or
resist information that threatens their preferred interpretation of what is
happening. Internal politics can also distort information flow, where
senders either bury key facts or put their own spin on them, either to
make themselves look better or to cater to a superior who doesn’t want
to know the whole truth.132

That is the most common definition, effectively requiring that the defendant be aware that he
doesn’t know the truth yet speaks falsely as if he does. See COX ET AL. supra, at 707-08. At the
pleading stage, there is a statutory requirement that the facts presented give rise to a strong inference of
scienter. Id. at 708-18.
127 See Michael D. Watkins & Max H. Bazerman, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen
Coming, Harv. Bus. Rev., March 2003, at 72; LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra, ch. 2.
128 See Biljana Adebambo et al., Anticipating the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Who Knew What and When Did
They Know It?, 50 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 647 (2015).
129 See Geoffrey Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazards: How Conceptual Biases in Complex
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 807 (2010).
130 See Watkins & Bazerman, supra, at 76.
131 For a recent survey of the literature, see Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: The
Role of Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. Econ. Perspectives 37 (2015). The connections between
overconfidence and the etiology of corporate fraud are explored in Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra,
at 35-42.
132 See Watkins & Bazerman, supra, at 77.
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This offers both opportunities and challenges for plaintiffs in disaster
cases.133 As a legal matter, they have to plead and prove corporate scienter,
the standards for which have puzzled the courts for decades. Being legal
fictions, corporations cannot act knowingly except to the extent
knowledge is attributed to them as a matter of law via their officers,
directors and agents. But not all the knowledge of corporate officials is
attributed to the firm, especially if it is scattered piecemeal among many
different persons. Courts want some more compelling connection
between the knowledge and the misstatements,134 which is
straightforward enough if there is evidence the person(s) who spoke on
the company’s behalf knew enough about the truth so as to have acted
with scienter. But that is not a necessity, especially at the pleading
stage.135 Courts seem to understand that besides just making things
excessively hard for plaintiffs, too a narrow test generates an obvious
incentive for executives to signal to subordinates that scienter-creating
information is to be kept from them so as to reduce the risk of both
personal and corporate liability. At the same time, an overly broad scope
to attribution, on the other hand, starts looking more like strict liability
for the issuer, which generates its own perverse incentives.136 Most
courts are willing to expand the zone of attribution beyond complicit

Disaster cases pose the hindsight bias problem, derived from psychological research (and folk
wisdom) that our thinking about the likelihood that an event would occur as of some prior point in time
is inevitably biased by knowing that it in fact did occur. This affects both materiality and scienter, to
the extent that fact-finder either imagines erroneously that management must have known that
something was amiss or overcorrects to absolve managers and the issuer for fear of imposing “liability
by hindsight. Both aspects of this problem are discussed extensively in G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by
Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004)
134 E.g., In re Hertz Global Holdings Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1536223 at *23 (D.N.J. 2017)(“the
pleaded facts must create a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the
corporation acted with the requisite scienter”); Silvercreek Mgt Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 2017 WL
1207836 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(“it is not enough to separately allege misstatements by some
individuals and knowledge belonging to some others where there is no strong inference that, in fact,
there was a connection between the two”).
135 See Teamsters Local 445 Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008). A
corporation can be liable under an agency law approach when the executive makes the misstatement
within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority. See In re ChinaCast Educ. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 809 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2015). In these kinds of cases, courts seem to assume that the
speaker must have acted with scienter.
136 As Jennifer Arlen has pointed out in her studies of corporate criminal liability, automatic corporate
liability discourages good internal compliance, because such compliance increases the probability of
discovering misconduct.
133
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actors only moderately, and here the doctrinal fog thickens.137 Many
extend the list of those whose knowledge is attributable to include those
who authorize the statement to be made even if they did not actually
formulate it, or who furnish information necessary to its formulation.138
The Sixth Circuit has recently taken this a step further, bringing onto the
list any who reviewed the statement before or after its release and
ratified, tolerated or recklessly disregarded the falsity.139 Other courts
simply use status in the organization as the test.140 There is particular
controversy over whether to allow plaintiffs to plead that information
must have been known to those sufficiently high up for attribution
purposes simply because it was so important that it surely would have
been known to them.141

B. Awareness and Compliance Controls

Whatever the particular attribution test applied, courts seem to want
to see enough evidence that the false or misleading statement could fairly
be described as intentional at the disclosure level. That would not likely
be so if the facts were bottled up somewhere in the firm and the senior
management responsible for the disclosure was entirely unaware of them
This issue is explored thoroughly in Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate
Scienter, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation:
Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1187, 1229-30 (2003).
138 E.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5 th Cir. 2004). Many
courts indicate that at the pleading stage, the standard is less strict than at trial. Teamsters Local 445
Pension Fund v. Dynex Cap. Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).
139 In re Omnicare Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 476 (6 th Cir. 2014); see also Doshi v. General Cable
Corp., 823 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2016).
140 E.g., Thomas v. Shiloh Industries, 2017 WL 2937620 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(“In the closest
approximation to a workable standard for determining corporate scienter, courts in this District have
held that ‘management-level’ employees can serve as proxies for the corporation. . . .”)
141 This idea was developed by Judge Posner in Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, 513 F.3d 702, 710
(7th Cir. 2008), on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in that case. This is effectively a
presumption of knowledge from the nature of the information and the inherent implausibility of it not
being widely known among senior managers. For some skepticism, see Plumbers Local 1200 Pension
Fund v. Washington Post Co., 930 F. Supp.2d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2013). Although useful in some
kinds of disaster cases, this “collective scienter” pleading aid is not necessarily all that useful for the
kinds of disasters that are outside the normal course of business. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel”
Marketing Sales Practices Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal. 2017)(refusing
to employ collective scienter approach, but finding other grounds for corporate scienter).
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(much less if no single person in the firm knew the troubling fact but
could have had a diligent effort been made to gather all the facts diffused
throughout the firm).
High-quality compliance systems are supposed to address this. As to
financial reporting specifically and disclosure generally, control systems
are a legal requirement for public companies. More far-ranging controls
as to legal and regulatory compliance are at least a de facto necessity as
well.142 A substantial body of learning and best practices has emerged in
the last decades about what constitute good controls. Not surprisingly,
quite a few disaster cases contain allegations of breakdowns in internal
compliance controls. Because the CEO and CFO have to certify their
oversight and an absence of known material deficiencies regarding
financial reporting, plaintiffs sometimes argue that an undisclosed control
failure constituted fraud. That could certainly be true in some cases, but
these kinds of arguments have not had much success where the
breakdown cannot be described with particularity so that plaintiffs’
argument seems to be that the later disaster event by itself proves that a
breakdown had occurred.143 On the other hand, highlighting a controls
system can put the issue of adequacy in play, as where a company that
handles toxic materials “discussed [its] pollution abatement equipment
and its provision of monitoring environmental teams on duty 24 hours a
day,” which the court found enough to potentially trigger a duty to
disclose because what was said “gave comfort to investors that reasonably
effective steps were being taken to comply with applicable environmental
regulations.”144 These are just variations on the issues discussed earlier.

E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Age of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075
(2016).
143 E.g., In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 731, 757-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(citing cases).
Even if this hurdle is jumped, plaintiffs must show that the breakdown was related to financial reporting
(see In re Petrochina Co. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp.3d 340, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)) and—eventually—
that the breakdown had a sufficiently tight causal connection to the disaster event.
144
Meyer v. Jinksolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 251(2d Cir. 2014); see also In re City of Brockton
Ret. System v. Avon Products Inc., 2014 WL 4832321 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 2014); In re Scottish Re
Group Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp.2d 370, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). To be sure, assessing internal controls is
difficult, and would be especially so for plaintiffs at the time they file a complaint, preceding any
discovery—the main point at which scienter assessments are made in fraud-on-the-market cases. There
can be some aid from the fact that external auditors are required to assess and report regarding material
weaknesses in financial reporting controls at larger issuers. And the larger the disaster the more likely
it is that government agencies or the financial media will have done their own investigations on which
plaintiffs can free-ride for evidence of recklessness.
142
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Could a well-plead allegation of a known control deficiency in
advance of a crisis also help with scienter? Precisely because of the
complex organizational nature of information flow, there can and should
be some meaningful way of ascribing recklessness to the system itself for a
failure to come to know, beyond whether those who did know were high
enough up. After all, corporations are distinct persons in the eyes of the
law whose securities law liability is generally seen as primary, not merely
derivative via respondeat superior.145 My impression is that a meaningful
form of scienter can (and should) be available without the practical and
doctrinal tangles associated with finding individual knowledge to
attribute. It would not be unreasonable or inconsistent with the
heightened pleading standard to allow plaintiffs in their complaints to
make a circumstantial case that the control failure that produced the
absence of high-level knowledge was not readily explainable except by
recklessness in the design or implementation of the control system.
Consider a case where a parent company suffered financially as a result of
disastrous wrongdoing at a major, recently-acquired subsidiary. Plaintiffs
are able to show that the parent’s internal control system was deliberately
compromised with respect to the sub, because the sub’s powerful CEO
would “go ballistic” at intrusions, thereby leading to a struggle to get
acceptable information. In just such a case, the court stumbled on the
meaning and nature of attribution as to the sub’s CEO, and dismissed the
case. But putting that attribution issue aside, the compliance failure itself
should have been treated as an allegation of corporate recklessness that
suffices at the pleading stage.146

V. CAUSATION AND DAMAGES

See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90
Wash. U. L. Rev. 933 (2013), criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), for employing an unrealistic view of the nature and
limits of corporate personhood.
146 For a case on essentially these facts that could well have been decided on this basis—but was not—
see Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 823 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2016). The court drew a distinction
between attribution of knowledge and attribution of scienter, and found the former present but the
latter lacking. This is not a common distinction to draw: most courts simply equate knowledge and
scienter, without looking for separate evidence as to the motivations behind the misrepresentation or
omission. See COX ET AL., supra, at 707.
145
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A. From Duty to Causation

We now move on to the final cluster of disaster-related issues on
which plaintiffs must sustain the burden of proof and persuasion:
reliance,147 loss causation and actual loss (damages). At first glance, it
would appear that these are disconnected from the duty to disclose issues
we’ve been examining, and should be relative easy to deal with. By
definition, a disaster brings with it an immediate and dramatic price
decline upon disclosure of the truth. That would seem to satisfy the
standard of loss causation, which is a command that plaintiffs demonstrate
some proximate link between the fraud and the loss so that the fraud-onthe-market claim does not to become a de facto insurance scheme by
compensating for price declines caused by other unrelated factors (e.g.,
extraneous market movements or supervening events).148 But as any law
student who has finished first-year torts would see, this is a financial
markets version of the Palsgraf problem, which is all about duty.149
To illustrate: after surviving so much motion practice trying to
dismiss plaintiffs’ “pre-spill” claims in the BP litigation, they failed at the
class certification stage because of a causation/damages problem.150 The
case illustrates a conundrum. So many fraud cases like BP are, as we have
seen, concealment allegations. In other words, had the defendants told
the truth about the risks, the market price would have been lower than
what investors paid during the class period.151 That would seem to lead
Reliance is a class-wide inquiry invoking the presumption endorsed in Basic and Halliburton II. See
notes --- supra. On lingering questions of what has to be demonstrated and by whom, see Sale &
Thompson, supra, at 546-50.
148 See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 811 (2009).
As Fisch shows, loss causation takes on more work than it is able to handle, which has led to immense
judicial confusion about what is necessary to be demonstrated, by whom, and why.
149 Palsgraf, of course, was about negligence liability, not intentional torts. Its relevance, however, has
been recognized in fraud cases. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.
2000).
150 Ludlow v. BP P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2015); see Lipton, supra, at 119-20.
151 Actually, there is another interesting duty issue embedded in this, which has received relatively little
attention from courts or commentators. In those situations where the issuer would have been entitled
to conceal the truth, the measure of distortion should be the difference between the price at the time of
the fraud and the price that would have prevailed had the issuer taken that option, which may be small
or non-existent. To assume truth-telling as the counterfactual takes duty beyond what courts have said
in 10b-5 cases. See Donald C. Langevoort, Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J.
Corp. L. 183 (2009).
147
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to an out of pocket damage measure that would give each investor the
dollars per share representing the difference between the actual purchase
price and the hypothetical “true” price. Empirically, however, that is
hard to construct. As a result, plaintiffs tend to turn to the later stock
price drop as approximating their real damages, which they adjust if there
are demonstrably extraneous or supervening events to be subtracted.
The problem, according to both the district court and the Fifth
Circuit, was that what was misrepresented was risk whereas plaintiffs
were asking for a measure based on the historical certainty that the
disaster did occur (the actual stock price drop). That, the judges thought,
would overcompensate them vis-à-vis the price distortion theory on
which their claim rested. In response, plaintiffs said that surely certain
investors, upon knowing the truth about disaster preparedness at BP,
would not have bought at all but instead put their money elsewhere. To
that the judges said that there was no way of knowing who or how many
of the class members would fit in this category, and that this open
question meant that plaintiffs’ theory and proof as to damages was not
common to the entire class. Hence, class certification failed.
The judges may be right in their assessment, though loss causation
was probably not the correct label for their reasoning. There was clearly
proximate cause: the foreseeable materialization of precisely the risk that
had been misrepresented. But the very nature of the fraud-on-the-market
lawsuit is about price distortion, so that a strict out-of-pocket measure
would seem to be the necessary corollary for those who want its relianceabsolving grace bestowed upon them. The mystery is why so many
courts have indicated a willingness to offer a rescission-based remedy
instead in these kinds of cases. That is a story for another time and
place.152
The measure of recovery in a Rule 10b–5 action always has been confusing. Not coincidentally, it
always has been an afterthought in Rule 10b–5 case law. Litigants seeking to establish the existence and
then the elements of a private cause of action under Rule 10b–5 were content to leave the measure of
recovery to be resolved another day. In almost all cases “another day” never came as cases settled
without the need to precisely define the measure of recovery. In those cases where the courts have been
forced to state a measure, they have provided a bewildering mix of standards, often using the same
terms, but frequently giving them radically different interpretations and doing little to resolve the
inconsistencies. For those cases that made it to the end, judges seemed more partial to providing rough
justice than to establishing a clean theoretical formula for recovery.” Robert B. Thompson, ‘‘Simplicity
and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery under Rule 10b–5, 51 Bus. Law 1177, 1179 (1996), quoted in Koch
v. Koch Indus., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1202 n.6 (D. Kan. 1998).
152
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Importantly, however, not every investor needs that grace.
Today, more and more investors limit their purchases to companies that
meet some threshold of social or environmental responsibility or
otherwise pay close attention to environmental performance.153 And
these are not usually the price-takers assumed in fraud-on-the-market
theory but active investors making customized investment decisions.
These become ideal “opt-out” plaintiffs willing to forego the presumption
of reliance in return for the ability to gain the advantages—including an
effort at rescission—that come from showing that their investment in the
company’s stock would not have occurred at all but for the falsity.154 It is
not hard to imagine socially-responsible investors, in particular, adjusting
their strategies and procedures to bolster this potential. Where actual
reliance can be shown, there are many possibilities for improving the
deterrence value of private securities litigation.155

B. Credibility and Gamesmanship

In the aftermath of corrective disclosure in light of some disaster,
the observable stock price drop often seems excessive in relation to the
fundamental value of the news that has just been revealed. A common
assumption is that this additional drop reflects the loss of credibility from
revealing the extent to which management showed itself willing and able
to dissemble, leading to the inference that other aspects of corporate
performance and prospects may also be unreliable—“collateral damage”
from the corrective news. One prominent study estimates that as much as
66% of a stock price decline in the aftermath of fraud is reputational.156
So here we find another subtle connection between duty and causation.
Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart
Money, J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis (forthcoming, 2017); note --- supra.
154 See David Webber, Shareholder Litigation without Class Actions, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 201 (2015). The BP
litigation had a substantial opt-out component.
155 This is the heart of Ann Lipton’s proposal to revive reliance in mismanagement cases by redesigning
the puffery doctrine, rethinking loss causation, affording “holder” claims and even creating a cause of
action for to facilitate greater shareholder governance. Lipton, supra, at 139-46.
156 See Jonathan Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 581
(2008). This may oversimplify, since there are so many different ways news relating to a disaster and
its aftermath may cause a stock price to drop. For instance, the news may indicate a greater likelihood
153
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There is a lively academic debate over whether the class of
investors suing in a fraud-on-the-market class action should be able to
recover for some or all of this collateral damage.157 It certainly is a
foreseeable consequence of the revelation, so that if this is simply a loss
causation problem addressable by reference to the “materialization of the
risk” standard used by many courts,158 the case for recovery seems almost
self-evident. On the other hand, if we focus on the time of the purchase
or sale, opponents argue that there is no distinctive deception about
credibility independent of the fraud itself. Without that, class members
have not been fraudulently misled about management’s credibility—preexisting credibility has simply been abused in the course of the fraud.159
They are in no different position from the longer-term investor who has
held the stock for years, who suffers precisely the same collateral damage
but has no right to recover.
Because of the widespread judicial confusion about causation and
damages, this argument is hard to resolve. As noted above, I am averse to
anything but a strict “out-of-pocket” measure of damages in fraud-on-themarket cases, as well as to obsessing on corrective disclosure. If fraudon-the-market is about remedying distortion, then the amount of
distortion at the time of the fraud has to be the only appropriate measure
of damages, which might seem to undercut the argument for including
of more intrusive regulation going forward, and thus a drag on profits. Research in the aftermath of the
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe show that other drilling companies suffered significant stock price
drops, presumably because of factors common to everyone engaged in that newly more risky business.
See Frank Heflin & Dana Wallace, The BP Oil Spill: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Environmental
Disclosures, 44 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 337 (2017). The decline affected firms with lower quality
environmental disclosure more than those who had been more forthcoming.
157 For discussions, compare Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities
Litigation, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 717 and Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule
10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163, 179-85
(2007)(collateral damage should not be recoverable) with Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in
Securities Litigation, 35 J. Corp. L. 169 (2009); Lipton, supra, at 122 (should be recoverable). Cornell
and Rutten, supra, tie their argument to the point discussed (and critiqued) extensively above: the
absence of a per se duty to disclose wrongdoing or mismanagement. 209 Utah L. Rev. at 738-41.
158 E.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). For a good explanation of
this idea, see Jay Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation and Loss Causation: Toward a
Corporate Finance Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. Law. 1419, 1442 (2004).
159 Black, supra, rightly notes that executive certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act do create an independent duty for senior managers to attest both to the accuracy of the financial
disclosures and the adequacy of internal controls, subject to a knowledge qualifier. Such certifications
can be important in imposing liability, especially the liability of the officers in question, in 10-Ks and
Qs, but not necessarily outside those reports. The role of a control failure on issuer liability is
discussed infra.
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collateral harm. But this approach actually offers an appealing middleground solution. Our earlier discussion of credibility as a variable (and its
potential to facilitate impression management) suggests that the prevailing
level of trust in management’s candor operates as a multiplier. Take two
issuers with different marketplace assessments of credibility: company A’s
management is viewed as truthful, while company B has lost investor
trust. If we imagine both companies making similar factual
announcements of hard-to-verify information, the price inflation for A
will be higher than for B. So if what is represented is untrue, the price
distortion will be larger for A. If so, then there is a portion of the price
distortion at the time of the fraud that does reflect credibility, not just
information, and the loss when the truth comes out is not just collateral
damage. Once again, reliance on the integrity of the market price—and
on the processes that underlie price formation—is an entitlement granted
to encourage socially valuable risk-taking by investors.

VI. DISASTERS AND SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE

There has been a growing effort through both public and private
channels to increase the amount and quality of corporate disclosure
relating to matters of environmental and social responsibility, under the
heading of “sustainability” disclosures.160 Proponents for more disclosure
see disasters great and small looming in the foreseeable future and want to
give investors and other stakeholders early warning as to which companies
are sensitive to and prepared for these risks and which are not. The goal
for some is to produce useful information, while others simply want to
use disclosure mainly to pressure companies into more sensitivity and
preparedness. Not surprisingly, mandated sustainability disclosure is
highly controversial. It has had more traction in Europe than in the U.S.,
where regulatory efforts are apparently now on a politically-induced
hiatus. In the U.S., business interests have made a concerted effort to
limit the SEC’s mandate to matters of financial materiality, but that is just
part of the resistance. In the current political climate, for example, one
See Ho, supra. In its 2016 Disclosure Reform release, the SEC requested comment on sustainability
disclosure, generating a large number of responses from both advocates and critics.
160
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can imagine the ideological consequences associated with imposing a rule
that issuers address the specific impacts of climate change among an
audience that includes so many climate change deniers.
As we have already seen, the supposedly clean separation between
the financial and the non-financial is an illusion.161 Even if we stick closely
to financial materiality, there is ample research tying environmental,
social and similar aspects of corporate behavior to stock market valuations
and firm profitability.162 Sustainability risks are priced. The hard
question is what specific disclosures mandates would add value in a costefficient manner, taking into account the many positive externalities
associated with accurate disclosure along with the inevitable costs.163 That
is the motivation behind the various non-government organization efforts
to fill the void via voluntary disclosure frameworks that avoid (directly, at
least) both the rigidity of formal administrative rule-making and political
battles for agenda control. In the U.S., the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB) is well underway in an effort to craft disclosure
standards for domestic companies tightly coupled to financial
materiality.164 Companies could opt-in, thereby creating expectations
about what and how they will reveal regarding sustainability metrics.
This approach has a number of virtues: the system has to be appealing
enough to issuers to generate a critical mass of adherents while
presumably also satisfying key investor stakeholder groups, thereby
gaining flexibility and cost-benefit discipline that the SEC itself might find
difficult to find.
Our interest here is about disaster-related litigation, particularly
class actions. The discussion connected to this is about whether (and if so
how much) fear of litigation “chills” voluntary sustainability disclosure.
This is of interest to sustainability proponents in two conflicting respects.
If there is such a chill, then the case for mandatory disclosure might seem
more compelling. On the other hand, if governmental sustainability
And as to the investors whose interests extend to sustainability mainly on ethical grounds, it is far
from clear how or why these concerns should be banished entirely from the realm of securities
regulation. See Williams, supra.
162 See Allen Ferrell et al., Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 585 (2015).
163 See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1887 (2013). On the costbenefit assessments of externalities as they relate to the agency’s “core mission,” see Alex Lee, Beyond
Agency Core Mission, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 551 (2016).
164 The SASB efforts in this direction are described in its comment letter to the SEC on disclosure
reform, dated July 1, 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-25.pdf.
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mandates are either unlikely for political reasons or unwise as a matter of
policy, the litigation threat might stand in the way of optimal disclosure
via a SASB-like process. This is a well-known conundrum. Issuer
adherence to mandatory disclosure standards varies based on the potency
of public and private enforcement threats together with the perceived
proprietary and reputational costs and benefits of either law-abidingness
or defection.165 Voluntary disclosure involves a different calculus, because
silence is a legitimate option. For decades now, there has been a working
assumption that the threat of investor litigation leads issuers to a lessthan-optimal disclosure policy, fearing the consequences if they make
statements or projections that turn out badly. That disserves investors to
the extent that what would have been disclosed was valuable. This was
the impetus behind the safe harbor for forward-looking information,
although the statutory product was overdone.
The litigation risks associated with sustainability disclosure can
easily be over-estimated, especially if the risks being discussed are likely
to emerge, if at all, only in the medium to long-term. Materiality natural
diminishes the longer the time horizon grows; the probability of any given
future is less and the magnitude of the impact less, if only because it has to
be discounted to present value.166 The only serious litigation risk is the
disaster that occurs relatively soon after the disclosures. Loss causation
issues also come into play here, because of the difficulties connecting
specific disclosures to stock prices losses far into the future. So does
scienter, in that knowing or reckless disregard is harder to show in times
of mind-numbing normalcy rather than palpable foreboding.
But near-term disasters are not impossible, and of course as time
goes by in a continuous disclosure environment, what was far off
gradually becomes less so. The remaining questions, not surprisingly,
take us back to duty. We have seen ample defendant-friendly case law,
especially in treating as puffery aspirational statements as to the issuer’s
commitment to safety, security and sustainability. But our main takeaway
was that these cases are not all that well thought through as a normative
matter, and counter-balanced by many other cases finding potentially
actionable fraud in other soft statements, especially when repeated or
See Karpoff et al., supra.
There is ample evidence that stock analysts focus on the near term because the longer term is so
much harder to predict and value with confidence. See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, at 105-07.
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made in response to heightened investor interest. In both the Deepwater
Horizon and Massey Energy litigation, plaintiffs pointed to the issuers’
voluntary sustainability reports as sources of actionable deception.167 As
investor interest in this area grows, issuers can’t be very confident that
the law will favor them when disaster ensues. It might, but it’s a gamble
that depends on how the judge they draw reacts to the particular
wordplay.
Could these same liability fears undermine SASB’s efforts to gain
traction? Any voluntary statement within the approved frameworks
would, of course, still be tested under Rule 10b-5. This raises the
question of whether an issuer’s voluntary commitment to the standards
creates a reasonable expectation for investors that what is said will be
fully responsive to those standards.168 My sense is that the answer should
be symmetric, so that if a duty to disclose derives from an SEC line-item,
as I think it is and should be, it should from a contractual commitment to
privately-promulgated standards as well. In other settings, it is clear
enough that following industry standards, even when they have some
regulatory imprimatur, cannot protect statements that otherwise have the
propensity to mislead.169
So compliance with SASB-like standards is a proper “duty” subject
for fraud-on-the-market litigation. And materiality as applied under Rule
10b-5 is explicitly the baseline for its sustainability standards, so that
element fits as well. The combination of duty and materiality, in turn,
means that some litigation threat remains. On the other hand, some
lessening of that threat comes from standardization: using a common
rubric with other similarly-situated issuers reduces the risk that comes
from being unique in what is said. Presumably, SASB could aid this by
explicitly setting boundaries for reasonable investor expectations. In
See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2d 600, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013)(may have been
misleading but scienter not adequately alleged because authorship of sustainability report not clear); In
re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597, 615 (S.D.W.Va. 2012)(Corporate Social
Responsibility Report contained possible omissions). The statutory safe harbor for forward-looking
information offers a cautionary lesson about even the most aggressive protections when judges sense
deceit. See pp. --- supra.
168 This is similar to the issue of whether the MD&A creates a duty in Rule 10b-5 cases, on which the
Supreme Court had been expected to rule. See note --- supra.
169 See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969)(adherence to generally accepted
accounting principles does not eliminate possibility that financial statements were nonetheless
misleading); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006)(same).
167
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outreach and guidance to the investor community, in other words, it
could emphasize that the standards have been crafted carefully to balance
investor demand for sustainability disclosure and peer comparability
against the costs and risks associated with providing such information, so
that adherence is not meant to put “in play” anything beyond the natural
or explicit confines of the standards. Too much protectionism, of course,
will backfire by turning the disclosure into unreliable cheap talk. A
reasonable, moderate statement of what investors should and shouldn’t
expect, however, might help assuage issuer fears enough to stimulate
participation in the voluntary regime notwithstanding residual fears, so
long as they see good market driven reasons to do so as well. Adherence
to the letter and spirit of high-quality voluntary sustainability disclosure is
more likely to lessen the litigation risk than increase it.

VII. CONCLUSION

Our inquiry into the etiology of corporate disasters sheds light on what
is emerging as a major issue in corporate disclosure theory and practice.
By this point it should be clear that the securities laws—and the fraud-onthe-market lawsuit in particular—are not as effective as they could or
should be at forcing either disclosure about or managerial attention to the
emergent risks leading up to a corporate disaster. Via either
gamesmanship or stone-cold silence, corporations can hide too much risk
and wrongdoing. In other words, there is something deeply unsatisfying
about making potentially massive fraud-on-the-market liability turn on
the wordplay underlying such small distinctions.
So we are back to the point at which we started Section I: if an issuer
has engaged in financially material wrongdoing but kept it hidden, the
market has been deceived (and the stock price distorted) regardless of
whether artful paltering about the issue crossed some fine line. Today,
however, courts disavow that it is their right or responsibility to optimize
the disclosure system or its remedies—that is for Congress and the
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SEC.170 Politics being what it is, the status quo will probably be with us
for the foreseeable future, so that courts will continue to struggle and
disagree about what to do in individual cases by asking and answering
questions that shouldn’t be outcome-determinative, but are. The effort to
promote stock price integrity deserves better than this.171 Ultimately,
how courts decide disaster cases says much about what norms of candor
companies have to follow in an increasingly complex and risky world, and
whether investors and others can depend on insiders not to hide the dark
clouds that are starting to appear on the internal radar screens when
everything still seems sunny to those outside.

Prior to the late 1970s, the courts were more open to a partnership role in duty-creation (see
Bauman, supra), which probably led the SEC to pay less attention to the design of the disclosure system
as a whole than it should have. Reg S-K and its doctrinal limitations are the legacy of that era.
171 Paying more attention to scheme liability may be a way forward. See note – supra. But courts have
been skeptical of scheme claims as backdoor ways of expanding the category of persons liable for fraud,
a skepticism that has its own collateral damage to the extent it also truncates fresh approaches to duty.
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